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INTRODUCTION
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) forbids
"[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce . . . ."' On its face, section 5 is a
* Attorney, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice; B.A. New College, 1971; J.D.
Harvard, 1973; The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Department of Justice.
15 U,S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
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broad delegation of authority to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC or the Commission) to reach a wide range of economic prac-
tices. Furthermore, the language of section 5 expresses the broadest
of the prohibitions contained in the federal antitrust and trade
regulation laws. Although the FTC has not yet attempted to use
section 5 as a broad authorization to act as roving commission to
regulate commercial activity, 2
 over the years it has used the statute
to reach a great variety of business practices often thought not to be
within the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act or the Robinson-Patman
Act. 3
 However, these apparent extensions of the three antitrust
statutes have not been without criticism." Specifically, the use of
section 5 of the FTCA to supplement and extend the Robinson-
Patman Act, a statute more criticized than praised, raises many
issues. Such issues relate to the relationship between those two
statutes, to the antitrust field in general, and to the propriety of
interpretation of any broadly-worded statute as a legislative man-
date to extend the sphere of a more narrow, controversial statute.
The United States has three major federal antitrust statutes: (1)
the Sherman Act, 5
 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, 6 and (3)
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 7 The
FTCA and the Clayton Act were passed to supplement the Sherman
Act; 8
 the Robinson-Patman Act was passed to strengthen the exist-
ing sanction against price discrimination and to afford equality of
2 See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935) (contrast-
ing § 5 of the FTCA with the National Industrial Recovery Act).
3 As in the case of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), Congress, in enacting the
FTCA, left undefined the prohibitions of the statute:
What shall constitute unfair methods of competition denounced by the act, is left
without specific definition. Congress deemed it better to leave the subject without
precise definition, and to have each case determined upon its own facts, owing to the
multifarious means by which it is sought to effectuate such schemes.
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
The response of Robinson-Patman Act afficionados to the Commission's decision in
Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960), illustrates the commentary which such § 5 cases
elicit. See, e.g., Alexander, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, A Deux ex
Machina in the Tragic Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 317
(1961); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75 (1961); Oppenheim, Guides
to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (1961); Rahi, Does Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act Extend the Clayton Act?, 5 Antitrust Bull. 533 (1960); Note, 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 291 (1961).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy" in restraint of interstate or
foreign trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 2 of the Act condemns not only combinations to
monopolize commerce but also unilateral attempts to do so. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
6
 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1970).
8 See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931).
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opportunity to competitors, especially buyers. 9 Unfortunately, the
various prohibitions of the several antitrust laws are not always in
harmony with one another.") Yet these three statutes, individually
and collectively, are the tools available for executing contemporary
antitrust policy. Antitrust policy is not merely a set of economic
rules governing market behavior but also a reflection of our social
philosophy;" and, as such, demands expression as a coherent, in-
tegrated policy rather than merely as an enumeration of prohibi-
tions. The problem arises in trying to draw an integrated policy
from these disparate sources.
Recently, the issue of harmonization of the antitrust statutes
has been brought to a focus by FTC statements' 2 concerning Com-
mission efforts to use section 5 of the FTCA "to its fullest extent, to
reach all practices with anti-competitive effects."" Attacking prac-
tices under section 5's "unfair methods of competition" language
avoids certain requirements of the more specifically worded Sher-
man, Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. The effects of such a
broad application of section 5 are very clearly exhibited where
section 5 is used as a tool to recast or supplement a statute as
specific and controversial as the Robinson-Patman Act. 14
As a prelude to analyzing the propriety of the use of section 5 as
a price discrimination law supplementary to the Robinson-Patman
9
 See, C. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 511-17 (1959).
'° See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co, of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J.); FTC v, Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 405 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "I am not unaware that the policies directed at maintaining
effective competition, as expressed in the Sherman Law, the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, are difficult to formulate and
not altogether harmonious." Id. at 405 (dissenting opinion).
The judiciary, however, has not been the only branch of the government to recognize this
difficulty. See, e.g., Report Of The Attorney General's National Committee To Study The
Antitrust Laws (1955):
Adherence to the essence of antitrust laws leaves us not unmindful of the risks in
oversimplifying the variant statutory formulations and their judicial construction.
The three major statutes—the Sherman, the Federal Trade Commission, and
Clayton Acts—have been interpreted and enforced . . with varying degrees of
autonomy. And the Sherman Act has gone through several cycles of judicial con-
struction.
Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Bork & Bowman, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy—The Crisis
in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev, 363, 364 (1965); Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 377, 382-84 (1965).
12 "Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has been likened to a slumbering
giant. Our authority extends to all 'unfair methods of competition,' and this is one of the
broadest mandates granted to any government enforcement agency." Kirkpatrick, The Fed-
eral Trade Commission and Antitrust Enforcement, 1971 New YOrk State Bar Ass'n, Anti-
trust L. Sym. 14, 18.
13
 Id.
14
 15 U.S,C.	 13 (1970).
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Act, this article presents a survey of the background and legislative
history of section 5. The use of section 5 as an antitrust tool against
unfair methods of competition is then examined and criticized."
Next a model is developed for the use of section 5 in the price
discrimination area. As the dissatisfaction with the Robinson-
Patman Act grows, the FTC may look more frequently to its section
5 •powers in order to restrain price discriminations which it cannot
reach under the Robinson-Patman Act. A look at the operation of
the model is provided in the final section of the article.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 5
The Federal Trade Commission derives its authority from sev-
eral sources. Section 5 of the FTCA authorizes the Commission to
prohibit "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices."'" Section 5 has been interpreted as empowering
the Commission to enforce the Sherman Act by means of the prohi-
bition against unfair methods of competition." Furthermore, Con-
gress has expressly delegated the administration of various statutes
to the Commission, the most important of which, for the purpose of
this analysis, are the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts.' 8
The legislative history of section 5 of the FTCA has been given
varying interpretations by different commentators. Professor Gerard
Henderson, in his classic work on the Federal Trade Commission,I 8
imports a broad reach to the section:
[T]he debates themselves suggest, what seems obvious
from the text of the Act, that it was the Congressional
19
 The Supreme Court held, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972),
that (I) section 5 empowers the FTC to proscribe an unfair competitive practice which does
not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws; and (2) section 5 empowers the
FTC to proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive regardless of their nature or quality as
competitive practices or their effect upon competition. Id. at 239.
This article does not consider whether price discrimination practices which may be
beyond the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act- and the "unfair methods of competition
language" of section 5 may nonetheless be attacked as "unfair or deceptive acts or practices,"
To date, the FTC apparently has relied upon the "unfair methods of competition" language
when issuing complaints against price discrimination practices under section 5. See text at
note 96 infra.
The role of section 5 as a tool for consumer protection and regulation of business
practices and ethics, though touched upon below, is beyond the scope of this article. It is
assumed that the authority to reach unfair practices beyond those likely to have anti-competi-
tive consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws currently lies in the "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" language and not the "unfair methods of competition" language.
16
 15 U.S.C. I 45 (1970).
17
 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953); FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 689-93 (1948).
' 0 For a list of numerous other regulatory statutes enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission, see Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75, 93 n.110 (1961).
19
 G. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission (1924).
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intention to confer on the Commission, subject to court
review, the duty of giving a detailed content to the general
principle embodied in the phrase [unfair methods of com-
petition], and to employ, in fulfilling this duty, not only the
rules and precedents established by the courts at common
law under previous statutes, but the technique of reasoning
by analogy and upon principle, with which jurists are
familiar. 20
Professors Eugene Baker and Daniel Baum also argue for a broad
reading of section 5, viewing it as a mandate empowering the
Commission to reach and to deal effectively with new techniques for
the development of economic power, and to develop regulation for
evolving commercial practices. 2 t On the other hand, Professor Mil-
ton Handler insists that while Congress could have given the Com-
mission the power of defining price discrimination boundaries as
unfair competition, it instead merely conferred the limited power to
enforce the Robinson-Patman Act, Clayton Act and Sherman Act. 22
The legislative history can be read to provide support for each
of these views. Businessmen in the early 1900's desired further
clarification and definition of the practices which fell within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 23 Instead, they received both a
general ethical and economic principle in the form of section 5, and
the specific prohibitions of the Clayton Act. The reach of the broad
mandate of section 5 was left to be determined by future judicial,
legislative and administrative action. 24 Section 5 supplemented
rather than amended or clarified the Sherman Act, while the
20 Id. at 36.
21 Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act A Continuing
Process of Redefinition, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 517, 542-43 (1962).
22
 Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Vale L.J. 75 (1961).
23 G. Henderson, supra note 19, at 17.
24 See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
The Federal Trade Commission Act (§ 5) introduced the expression "unfair
methods of competition" which were declared to be unlawful. That was an expres-
sion new in law . . . . We have said .. that it does not admit of precise definition,
its scope being left to judicial determination as controversies arise. [citations omitted]
What are "unfair methods of competition" are thus to be determined in particular
instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular competitive conditions and of
what is found to be a specific and substantial public interest. [citations omitted]
Provision was made by Congress] for formai complaint, for notice and hearing, for
appropriate findings of fact supported by adequate evidence, and for judicial review
to give assurance that the action of the Commission is taken within its statutory
authority.
Id. at 532-33. See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
"A constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to
affect its purposes." Id. at 778. In the same case, the Court also noted that additional,
subsequent legislation did not restrict the concept of "unfair methods of competition." Id. at
783-84.
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Clayton Act, written in precise terms, isolated and defined certain
enumerated practices, and subjected them to special prohibitions
and methods of enforcement. It does seem clear from the legislative
history that some latitude was to be given to the Commission to give
content to section 5:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question
as to whether it would attempt to define the many and
variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to
forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general
declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the
commission to determine what particular practices were
unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the
better for the reason . . that there were too many unfair
practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the
law it would be possible to invent others. 25
However, at the time section 5 was enacted, the scheme of the
antitrust statutes did not include the Clayton Act and the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, although the Clayton Act was being discussed in
House and Senate committees when section 5 was passed. 26
 There-
fore, the determination of the reach of the section 5 delegation of
authority to the Commission, must be made in conjunction with an
analysis of the effect of subsequent legislation relating to the same
subject matter.
While it has long been held that section 5 may be used beyond
common law prescriptions or previoUsly adjudicated Sherman Act
violations to reach conduct proscribed by the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts" and conduct constituting incipient Sher-
man Act violations, 28
 the justifications for so extending the Acts
have not been critically examined. 29 The legislative history of the
Robinson-Patman Act, for example, indicates that those instances of
25
 S. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
a' G. Henderson, supra note 19, at 28-33. There was in fact much debate over whether
the phrase "unfair methods of competition" in the Federal Trade Commission Act would
cover the specific practices enumerated in the Clayton Act. See S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914); 51 Cong. Rec. 15828-29, 16147, 16154, 162 73 (1914).
27
 See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463, 466
(1941).
25 FTC v. R.F. Keppel	 Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934).
29
 The courts have tended to defer too readily to Commission "expertise." See, e.g., FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
The precise impact of a particular practice on the trade is for the Commission, not
the courts, to determine. The point where a method of competition becomes "unfair"
within the meaning of the Act will often turn on the exigencies of a particular
situation, trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business in question.
Id. at 396.
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price discrimination included within the provisos and exceptions of
the Robinson-Patman Act were not meant to be subject to antitrust
attack, but gives no direction with regard to those price discrimina-
tions which are neither explicitly protected nor specifically pro-
scribed by the Robinson-Patman Act. Furthermore, the Commission
has never offered an all-encompassing justification for the use of
section 5 to attack conduct which is similar to conduct prohibited by
the antitrust laws but not within those prohibitions.
It is the thesis of this article that section 5 should be used to
condemn those pricing practices: (1) which are in form and effect
similar to those condemned by the Robinson-Patman Act; (2) which
are not protected by a statutory defense or proviso; and (3) which
produce anti-competitive effects outweighing any justification or
social benefits. The language of section 5 refers to unfair methods of
competition, and hence, it is reasonable to read section 5 as con-
cerned with injury to specific competitors only where such injury
produces injury to competition as well. Congress has not subjected
every business practice which is potentially anti-competitive to the
antitrust laws, and the Commission should take note of this funda-
mental fact in its use of section 5 as an enforcement weapon. The
adoption of a rule of reason test for section 5 violations is urged as
being consonant with the basic or central policy of the antitrust
laws. Such a construction of section 5 could harmonize the language
of the statute with traditional national antitrust policy."
Further evidence that "unfair methods of competition" should
be defined as those business practices which unreasonably injure
competition as opposed, for example, to a business practice which
would tend to encourage competition [although to the detriment of
an individual competitor or two] is provided by the Conference
Report accompanying the enactment of the FTCA. That Report
stated:
It is now generally recognized that the only effective means
of establishing and maintaining monopoly . . . is the use of
unfair competition. The most certain way to stop
monopoly at the threshold is to prevent unfair competition.
This can be best accomplished through the action of an
administrative body of practical men thoroughly informed
" To be sure, the construction of every such statute presents a unique problem in
which words derive vitality from the aim and nature of the specific legislation. But
bearing in mind that in ascertaining the scope of congressional legislation a due
regard for a proper adjustment of the local and national interests in our federal
scheme must always be in the background, we ought not to find in § 5 radiations
beyond the obvious meaning of language unless otherwise the purpose of the Act
would be defeated.
FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941).
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in regard to business, who will be able to apply the rule
enacted by Congress to the particular business situations,
so as to eradicate evils with the least risk of interfering
with legitimate business operations.
. . . Whether competition is unfair or not generally
depends upon the surrounding circumstances of the par-
ticular case. What is harmful under certain circumstances
may be beneficial under different circumstances. 31
The question, therefore, is not how far the Commission can go
in using section 5 to extend the reach of the other antitrust statutes.
Rather, the issue is how far ought it go, assuming the desirability of
harmonizing the several antitrust statutes and forging a unified and
coherent program of antitrust enforcement. Accordingly, in applying
section 5 to extend the dimensions of the other antitrust laws, it is
asserted that the Commission should always look both to the section
5 prohibition against those unfair methods of competition which
have substantial anti-competitive effects and to the types of prac-
tices at which the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act are aimed. In doing so, care must be taken
not to use section 5 to extend the antitrust statutes in a direction
contrary to the mainstream of antitrust policy, i.e., in a manner
which makes section 5 applicable to practices which may not be
anti-competitive or, may be anti-competitive but not in the form or
with the effects which Congress chose to proscribe by the three
antitrust statutes. In sum, enforcement of section 5 should be
guided, by rule of reason standards, measured in terms of the
anti-competitive dangers addressed in the Sherman, Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts.
II. FASHIONING A GENERAL ANTITRUST WEAPON:
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 5
Early attempts by the Federal Trade Commission to employ
section 5 as an antitrust statute were defeated by narrow judicial
interpretations of the statutory language. In the first section 5 case
decided by the Supreme Court, FTC v. Gratz, J 2 the Court estab-
lished criteria for a section 5 violation: (1) a violation of the Sherman
or Clayton Acts; or (2) a violation of prevailing and accepted stan-
dards of comn'iercial morality. This restrictive approach was re-
peated in FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 33 FTC v. Sinclair
31 H.R. Cont. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
32
 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
33
 260 U.S. 568, 512 (1923) (exclusive dealing contract).
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Refining, 34 and FTC v. Eastman Kodak. 35 In the former two cases,
the Court refused to find a section 5 violation absent a showing of
unlawful motive, defined in terms of existing antitrust laws and
prevailing moral standards. In Eastman Kodak, the Court, while
finding a section 5 violation, held that the Commission, though
proceeding under section 5, was empowered to grant no greater
relief than the Clayton Act itself authorized. 36
The 1940's saw the demise of the Gratz test, the evolution of an
expansive interpretation of section 5, and the appearance of dicta
which evidenced an even more expansive reading. The expansion
began in the sphere of Sherman Act and Sherman Act-type cases. In
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 37 the Supreme
Court enunciated the incipiency doctrine, which it defined as em-
powering the Commission to attack, as unfair methods of competi-
tion, those practices which may, when full-blown, violate the Sher-
man or Clayton Act." Similarly, in Cement Institute v. FTC, 39 the
Court held that a multiple basing point pricing system tended to
restrain trade and thus constituted an unfair method of competition,
regardless of whether the conduct was also a violation of the Sher-
man Act" or merely an incipient Sherman Act practice.'"
34 261 U.S. 463 (1923). "The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has
no general authority to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary
business methods or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the conflict for
advantage called competition." Id. at 475-76.
35 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
36 Eastman Kodak, prior to the Commission's action, had acquired some photographic
laboratories which were used as leverage in negotiating a reciprocal agreement with Allied
Laboratories, a foreign company. The agreement provided that Allied would use only
American-made film (Kodak's) and Kodak would not use its laboratories in competition with
Allied, The Court held that even if acquisition of the laboratories was a step in an unfair
method of competition, the Commission did not possess the equity power necessary to order
divestiture. Id. at 625.
37 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
3 ' Id. at 466. The Court found that the combination of manufacturers which sought to
suppress competition by others who copied their designs violated the principle and policy of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts due to the presence of unlawful purposes, potential power,
coercion or tendency to monopolize. Id. at 467. The practices ran counter to the Clayton Act
because the sale of textiles and garments was conditioned upon the buyer's agreement not to
deal in the copies. Id. at 464. The combination was counter to the Sherman Act because the
Commission found that it foreclosed outlets, constituted an organized boycott, and resulted in
the suppression of competition from the sale of unregistered textiles and copied designs. Id. at
465.
39 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
41/ Id. at 692, 720.
41 Cement Institute involved a combination in restraint of trade made effective through
agreement, express or implied, to adopt a multiple basing point pricing system. The combina-
tion had been in existence for many years, and the Commission found that its pricing system
had produced uniform prices and terms of sale throughout the country. It is significant to note
that while the Commission's order was pending in the court of appeals, and prior to the
Supreme Court decision, the Justice Department filed a Sherman Act § 1 proceeding against
the same respondents.
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Cement Institute was extended in Triangle Conduit & Cable
Co. v. FTC, 42 a case upholding a section 5 complaint against indi-
vidual sellers for parallel pricing as part of a delivered pricing
system. In condemning the conscious parallelism in the use of a
delivered price system, the Commission and the court emphasized
that each seller knew that each other seller was using and would
continue to use the same basing point formula. The court also
discussed the economics underlying delivered pricing and noted
that, even absent an explicit agreement, the delivered pricing system
depended upon reciprocal pricing practices. It is thus difficult to
determine whether the Triangle Conduit case condemned parallel
pricing when used to implement a delivered pricing system or only
when such individual pricing grew out of a delivered pricing system
originally implemented by a conspiracy.
The Supreme Court condemned the latter scheme several years
later in a section 5 case, FTC v. National Lead Co. 43 There, the
Court approved the FTC decree prohibiting the individual respon-
dents from continuing to quote delivered prices "for the purpose or
with the effect of systematically matching the delivered . . . prices of
other sellers . . . ." 44
 The Court observed that such an order against
the individual parties was necessary to prevent the parties from
continuing to use their prior arbitrary zone delivered pricing system
without the necessity of a conspiracy, which had been enjoined.
Triangle Conduit and National Lead illustrate the use of section 5
when there exist alternative, independent methods of accomplishing
the same result, some of which, in the Commission's view, could not
be reached under the Sherman Act itself.
It is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between the
Commission's use of section 5 in the Sherman Act area and in the
Clayton Act area. Occasionally, the Commission and the courts
have condemned a practice generally as violating the policies of both
acts.'" The vague dicta found in several such cases" gave rise to
much of the confusion accompanying the use of section 5 in the
antitrust field. For example, in a 1953 opinion, FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Service Co., 47 condemning a motion picture
41 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affd mem. sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v, FTC, 336
U.S. 902 (1949).
43 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
44 Id. at 423.
45 See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). The
practice has occurred in recent years as well. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316
(1966).
46 Confusing dicta are enunciated and repeated in several cases: Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606-09 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild of America,
Inc., 312 U.S. 457, 463-66 (1941); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931).
47 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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distributor's exclusive contracts with ten percent of the available
theatres (and with 40% of the theatres in its geographical area) as an
unfair method of competition, the Court asserted that section 5 was
designed to reach incipient violations of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Without producing evidence of a conspiracy or concerted
action, and speaking in the Clayton Act language of foreclosure and
tendency to monopolize, the majority found a violation of Sherman
Act policy." The opinion's reasoning was quite unclear as to how "a
device which has sewn up the market so tightly for the benefit of a
few" falls within the Sherman Act, and neglected to provide any
rule of reason analysis of the harms and benefits from the challenged
agreements. 49
The basis for the more broad application of section 5 was also
broadly but vaguely expressed in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co." In that
case, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that proof of anti-
competitive effect must be shown under section 5, and approved the
application of section 5 to "practices which conflict with the basic
policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts." 5 i The Court, reiterating
the incipiency argument, said that Brown Shoe's franchise program
"obviously conflicts with the central policy of both section 1 of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts
which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open
market."52 Thus, the Brown Shoe decision left the outer boundaries
of section 5 almost undefined. By failing to inquire into•the extent to
which competing shoe suppliers were foreclosed, the Court in
Brown Shoe extended the Commission's powers under section 5 well
beyond the confines of the other antitrust laws. The policies of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts tolerate those practices whose redeeming
virtues outweigh their competitive harms. The Brown Shoe Court
did not indicate that it would be bound by this test, nor did it
indicate just what limits it would apply to section 5.
The Court has also approved the Commission's use of section 5
to reach practices which resembled tying arrangements and which,
the Court found, placed an unfair burden and a significant restraint
upon a substantial amount of commerce. In Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC 53 and FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 54 the Court upheld the FTC's
48 Id. at 395.
49 Id, A possible explanation is that thb Commission, being uncertain whether the
agreement fell within the Clayton Act, chose to proceed under § 5; the Court, rather than
being restricted by the potential agency agreement issues raised by a Clayton Act analysis,
followed the expansive dicta of earlier cases and upheld the Commission's determination
under § 5. Id. at 394-98.
5° 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
51 Id. at 321.
32 Id.
33 381 U,S. 357 (1965).
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attack upon sales-commission arrangements between a tire man-
ufacturer and an oil company. Concluding that the arrangements
had an adverse effect on competition in the marketing of tires,
batteries and accessories, the Court examined only evidence con-
cerning the large dollar amount of commerce that was involved and
the increasingly important role that service stations exercised in the
marketing of tires, batteries and accessories, without inquiry into
the possible benefits from such arrangements. 55 The Court in Tex-
aco simply adopted the Atlantic Court's conclusionary statement that
"there would be little point in paying substantial commissions to oil
companies were it not for their ability to exert power over their
wholesalers and dealers. . ."56 Thus, by holding that domi-
nant economic power was in itself sufficient to render a sales-
commission agreement illegitimate, the Court approved the use of
section 5 as a per se rule against inherent coercion. 57 Moreover, in
neither the Atlantic nor the Texaco case did the Court analyze the
possibility of applying section 1 of the Sherman Act if indeed the
practices were not proscribed by section 3 of the Clayton Act.
III. THE INCIPIENCY AND POLICY DOCTRINES—THE
EXPANSION OF SECTION 5
A. The Relationship between Section 5 and the Sherman Act
An examination of the merits of utilizing section 5 to extend
and supplement the Sherman and Clayton Acts first requires inquiry
into the nature and identity of those practices which are not covered
by the Sherman or Clayton Acts but which would be encompassed
by section 5 of the FTCA. The section 5 prohibition against "unfair
methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce" is broader than the language of the
Sherman Act. Specifically, section 5 covers a more extensive range
of unilateral actions than does the "attempt to monopolize" language
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
There is one important class of unilateral practices which,
though outside the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, falls within the
reach of section 5. Congress, as was recognized years ago in FTC v.
R.F. Keppel & Brother, Inc. 58 and more recently in FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 59 defined the powers of the Commission to
54 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
55
 "To the extent that dealers are induced to select the sponsored brand in order to
maintain the good favor of the oil company upon which they are dependent, to that extent the
operation of the competitive market is adversely affected. . ." 393 U.S. 223, 229 (1968).
56 393 U.S. 223, 229 (1968), citing Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 376 (1965).
57 393 U.S. at 232 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
59 405 U.S. 233 (1972),
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protect consumers as well as competitors. The Commission can use
section 5 to reach practices which do not pose a threat to competi-
tion within the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws but nonetheless
injure consumers or otherwise constitute unethical practices. How-
ever, if the values involved in a particular application of section 5 to
a unilateral unfair practice are "beyond simply those enshrined in
the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws," 6° then
this use of section 5 is not an extension in the direction of Sherman
Act policy, but rather the evolution of a completely different policy.
The Sherman Act was directed at only those unilateral acts which
either constitute monopolization or which, though insufficient in
themselves to produce monopoly, are accompanied both by an in-
tent to do so and a dangerous probability that the intended result
will occur." If unfair unilateral practices which do not meet these
requirements may be attacked under section 5, the justification must
come from a source other than the Sherman Act.
Section 5 may also be given a broader scope in the Sherman Act
area by extending it to cover unfair practices involving agreement.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade. As in the unilateral
practice situation described above, section 5 language may be ap-
plied to cover unethical practices which are the result of contract,
combination or conspiracy but have negligible effects on competi-
tion. However unethical they may be, such practices should not be
reached by a reading of section 5 grounded on Sherman Act policy,
since the Sherman Act condemns only those combinations which
unreasonably restrain trade, and does not reach those combinations
with little or no effect on competition.
The controversy over the use of section 5 to reach Sherman
Act-type violations is most acute when the combination actually is
restrictive of competition. The Commission and the courts have
employed section 5 to reach such practices where the practice is also
prohibited by the Sherman Act as well as where it is deemed to be
outside the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. 62 When used in the
former situation, the section 5 charge is superfluous at best; at worst
it results in a substitution of section 5 standards for those prescribed
by Congress or established judicially in Sherman Act cases. 63
It is the theory of this article that practices which cannot be
60 Id. at 244.
61 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
62 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 689-73 (1948). But cf. Report Of The
Attorney General's National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws 148-49 n.78 (1955).
63
 This would occur if the Commission were to develop a separate burden of proof
standard, independent of the Sherman Act and applicable to 5 cases.
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reached under the Sherman Act itself should not be reached by
section 5 under a Sherman Act justification. The judicially created
rule of reason" limits the applicability of the Sherman Act prohibi-
tions to those practices which unduly restrain competition or trade
without a sufficiently justifiable purpose. 65 The policy behind the
Sherman Act requires a detailed inquiry into dangers and benefits,
effects and alternatives, before condemning or approving agree-
ments. If, after such an inquiry, it is determined that the
justifications outweigh the harms (actual and potential), and there-
fore that the combination should be permitted to continue rather
than being struck down because of the Sherman Act, it is difficult to
understand the justification for striking it down under section 5.
The "policy" of the Sherman Act should operate no less effectively
in Sherman Act cases than in section 5 cases.
The Commission and the courts, however, have often given
section 5 a more extensive reach than the Sherman Act. In reaching
anti-competitive conduct not violative of the Sherman Act, viola-
tions of section 5 have been nonetheless found. Two doctrines
have been used to justify this extension: (1) the "incipiency" doctrine
and (2) the "policy" doctrine. The basis of the incipiency doctrine is
that section 5 should be used "to stop in their incipiency acts and
practices which, when full blown, would violate those [the Sherman
and Clayton] Acts . . . ."66 The policy doctrine applies section 5 to
conduct which violates the principles and policies of the Sherman
Act.
If the incipiency doctrine is read as an authorization to con-
demn any combination which, if hypothetically expanded in time
and space, would result in an unreasonable restraint of competition,
the doctrine would in fact be without meaning. For example, an
application of that doctrine would permit section 5 to prohibit any
exclusive dealing arrangement or requirements contract entered into
between one buyer and one seller, regardless of the lack of any
adverse effect on competition or the existence of any economic
justifications for the combination. A second possible application of
the incipiency doctrine is to use that doctrine as if it were an
"attempt" statute, i.e., as legislation affording the basis for attack-
ing the first step in a scheme to violate the Sherman Act. This
application of the incipiency doctrine theoretically would permit
section 5 to reach combinations which, though currently having
insufficient anti-competitive effect to fall within the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act, evidence an intent to effectuate illegal competitive
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 65 (1911).
's United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
66
 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
164
TOWARD A COHERENT ANTITRUST POLICY
restraints. The justification for this application of the incipiency
doctrine assumes an interpretation of the Sherman Act which is not
proper.
In framing section 1 of the Sherman Act, Congress did not
require any particular set of effects as proof of a violation, but
rather expected the use of a balancing process. Applied literally the
language of the Sherman Act is "broad enough to embrace every
conceivable contract or combination" and therefore "inevitably ..
called for the exercise of judgment" on the part of the judges to
determine which combinations unduly restrained trade and which
were reasonable.° For the purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act
a combination which adversely affects competition and for which
insufficient economic justification can be offered, is as much a
restraint of trade whether it is in its early stages or "full-blown."
Conversely, a justifiable combination which is in its incipiency
should not be condemned simply because there exists the possibility
that eventually it may expand so as to lose its present justification.
In applying the incipiency doctrine, the Commission and the
courts have in fact reached practices within the normal scope of the
prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman Act. For example, it is
difficult to see why the long term exclusive contracts in the Motion
Picture Advertising Service case, 68 should not fall within the pro-
hibition of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Surely contracts which
violate the policy of the Sherman Act (i.e., the rule of reason) for the
purpose of a section 5 case would violate the same policy in a
Sherman Act case. The same is true of Fashion Originators' Guild 69
and Cement Institute, 70 two cases in which section 5 was used to
reach a collective boycott and a delivered pricing scheme, respec-
tively. In each case the participants in the combinations were shown
to have acted with intent to restrain competition. The Commission
should not have refused to hear evidence offered on the reasonable-
ness of the methods pursued by the combination. It is not clear that
all combinations involving boycotts should be subject to a per se
rule under either the Sherman Act or section 5 of the FTCA. More
importantly however, it is not clear that section 5 was needed at all
to reach the Guild's agreement. Evidence was presented that there
was a boycott agreement which did restrain trade 71 and thus the
evidence introduced was sufficient to support a section 1 Sherman
Act complaint. Section 5 was also resorted to unnecessarily in Ce-
67 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
68 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
69 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
7° 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
71 312 U.S. at 464-65.
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ment Institute to strike down a delivered pricing scheme. As set
forth above, 72
 the label "incipient" could hardly be applied to the
Cement Institute case since the delivered pricing scheme had been in
effect nationwide for several years and had produced uniform prices
and terms of sale throughout the country. 73 Those circumstances,
combined with the inference of agreement made by the Court,
should have been sufficient to bring the practice within the proscrip-
tions of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The application of similar analysis to cases in which the use of
section 5 has been justified on policy grounds rather than under the
incipiency doctrine illustrates that the practices to which the Com-
mission and courts have applied the policy either could have been
attacked under section I of the Sherman Act or should not have
been prohibited at all. For example, in Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC 74 and FTC v. Texaco, Inc.," where the Commission's section 5
complaiht read as a hybrid of Sherman, Clayton section 3, and
Robinson-Patman allegations, the policy doctrine was used to ex-
tend section 5 to reach practices which, if economically and socially
justifiable, were arguably permissible business practices, and, if not
so justifiable, were violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Although the Texaco tires, batteries and accessories sales-
commission agreements may not have been fully justifiable, the
court should have given consideration, as one possible justification
to a plan which enabled an oil company to meet the demands of its
outlets for tires, batteries and accessories promptly and without the
cost of warehousing. Putting aside any overtly coercive practices
(which the Commission had separately enjoined under section 5), 76
the Court basically employed section 5 as a per se rule for striking
down a possibly justifiable agreement because of the inherent coer-
cion that exists between a franchisor and a franchisee, or a large
seller and small buyer. On the other hand, if, as the facts indicate,
the tire companies dealt with and delivered to the individual retail
outlets, it is hard to imagine a legitimate purpose served by the
agreement which paid a commission to the oil companies on such
transactions. Absent a judicial attempt to balance the economic and
business justifications against the harmful effects of the arrange-
ment, it cannot be determined whether the agreements were reason-
able business arrangements which should be permitted to stand or
unreasonable restraints which should be struck down under section
72 See text at note 39 supra.
73
 333 U.S. at 713, 715.
74 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
75
 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
76
 381 U.S. at 361, 363.
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1 of the Sherman Act. However, neither alternative required the use
of section 5. Furthermore, the Court's approach in the Texaco case
opened the door to using section 5 arbitrarily in those unequal
bargaining situations where the larger party's interest was created
by virtue of an agreement with a third party."
In National Lead" and Triangle Conduit," the policy ap-
proach produced a better-reasoned though unnecessary application
of section 5. In order to effectuate a Sherman Act decree, a section 5
cease and desist order was entered forbidding each respondent indi-
vidually from adopting the same or similar system of pricing for the
purpose of matching the prices of competitors." Without the section
5 order, the parties could have individually continued their pricing
policies and thus benefited from , the years of practice acquired
during the conspiracy period. The statement by the Court in Na-
tional Lead that the Commission "must be allowed effectively to
close all roads leading to the prohibited goal"" illustrates that the
Court used section 5 as an aid in enforcing the anti-monopoly and
pro-competitive policies of the Sherman Act, in much the same way
the Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act. In each of these
cases, the courts set out the effects of the practices and then used
section 5 to stop these practices which had no justification other
than to continue, in fact if not in law, the same pricing system
which had been enjoined under the Sherman Act.
In summary, in light of the fact that the Sherman Act has been
and is presently being used to reach all those monopolistic or
restraint-of-trade practices which fall within the ambit of its policy,
there are no Sherman Act-type practices with regard to which it
would be appropriate to find a violation of section 5 which would
not already fall under the Sherman Act itself.
B. Section 5 and the Clayton Act
In view of the less rigid requirements for illegality under the
Clayton Act82 than under the Sherman Act, there is less reason to
resort to the broad language of section 5 and the incipiency and
policy doctrines in the Clayton Act area than there is in the Sherman
Act area. The Clayton Act itself was designed to halt incipient
77 See Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in the Texaco case. 393 U.S. at 223-32
(dissenting opinion),
76 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
79
 Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v, FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), of 'd mem. sub.
nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 902 (1949).
" 352 U.S. at 423; 168 F.2d at 176.
91 352 U.S. at 429.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), provides in part: "[W]here the effect . . . may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
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practices likely to grow into Sherman Act violations." Furthermore,
the basis of liability under the Clayton Act is expressed in terms of
reasonable probability of anti-competitive harm or tending to hinder
competition unduly or to create a monopoly, all of which amount to
an incipiency test. However, labeling incipient Clayton Act viola-
tions unlawful under section 5. would result in the prohibition of
incipient incipiency, which is a meaningless concept.
In the Brown Shoe case, 84 the Court applied both the incip-
iency and the policy tests to sustain the Commission's determina-
tion that Brown's franchising plan violated the central policy of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, and hence constituted a violation of
section 5. 85 It is difficult to determine exactly what the Court meant
by classifying the franchise program as an incipient violation. If the
Court intended to state that the franchise program, though within
the spirit of the general prohibition of section 3 of the Clayton Act,
had not yet risen to the level of a full blown section 3 violation due
to lack of showing of anti-competitive effects, then the Court effec-
tively removed all constraints on the application of section 5 to the
antitrust field. Numerous commercial practices, if pursued on a
large enough scale and over an extended time period, would yield
anti-competitive results, but it would be inconsistent with the policy
underlying the Clayton Act to prohibit each incipient practice in
that category.
The Clayton Act is aimed at particular types of anti-competitive
effects. It is not directed at all practices which may tend to lessen
competition, but only at those which lessen competition in ways
thought. to be particularly dangerous. The United States is not a
completely regulated economy; business practices are presumed legal
unless prohibited by a specific statute. The Clayton Act, like the
Sherman Act, tolerates those business practices which do not un-
reasonably restrain competition. Reasonable is defined not only in
terms of extent of injury, but also in terms of the procedure causing
the injury and the manner of inflicting the injury. For this reason,
the use of the "policy" doctrine to extend the reach of section 5 of
the FTCA is as inappropriate in the Clayton Act sphere as in the
Sherman Act sphere. By means of "policy" and "incipiency" lan-
guage, a court may easily avoid inquiry into actual anti-competitive
effects and pro-competitive justifications, and therefore may con-
demn too quickly an agreement between a seller and an insignificant
number of buyers that may have sufficient benefits to justify its
existence.
L See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, .577 (1966).
" FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (19661.
85 Id. at 320-22.
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However, the parallel which has been drawn between the
Sherman and Clayton Acts with respect to section 5 does not
sufficiently cover each situation. Closer examination reveals that
unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act contains "technical" limi-
tations in its scope, and that it would be appropriate to broaden the
scope of section 5 in the area of these technical limitations. Section 3
of the Clayton Act is limited to leases, sales or contracts for sale "of
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commod-
ities"86 and section 7 is limited to corporations. 87 The FTC's use of
section 5 of the FTCA to proceed against practices which are
economically equivalent to those enumerated in the Clayton Act but
which do not fall within the letter of the Act because of a jurisdic-
tional or technical deficiency—termed the "jurisdictional deficiency"
theory88—has been advocated by commentators and supported by
the Report of the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee."
Unlike the practices which a "policy" or "incipiency" doctrine
would bring within the scope of an expanded FTCA section 5, the
jurisdictional deficiency approach does not by itself reach either
practices which are already covered by the specific language of the
Clayton Act or practices which are not covered by the Clayton Act
because they do not produce the requisite anti-competitive effects.
The jurisdictional deficiency doctrine covers practices whose
economic effects are the same as their statutorily-enumerated coun-
terparts. Furthermore, while the jurisdictional omissions from sec-
tions 3 and 7 may not have been completely inadvertant, neither
were they the result of a deliberate decision integral to the further-
ance of the policies of the Clayton Act. 9 °
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided any jurisdic-
tional deficiency section 5 cases, the Commission has used this
approach frequently when proceeding against practices technically
beyond those enumerated in the Clayton Act. 91 Transactions such as
loans, gifts, construction services, painting benefits, alleged to be
expressly or impliedly conditioned on exclusive dealing, have been
the subject of section 5 complaints. In two such cases, Shell Oil
66
 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
87 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970),
'58
 The leading article on this theory is Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts; 59 Mich. L, Rev.
821 (1961).
69 Report Of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws
148-49 n.78 (1955).
9° See, the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act, c.1184, 64 Stet 1125 (1950)
amending 15 U.S.C. § 18, in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Seri?, 4293. See also Beatrice Foods Co.,
11965-67 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 11 17311, at 22,469 {FTC Doc. No. 7599).
91 See the cases collected in Oppenheim, supra note 88, at 845 n.70.
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Co. 92 and Socony Mobil Oil Co. 93 the Commission adopted the
Hearing Examiner's dismissal recommendation for failure of reli-
able, probative and substantial evidence of reasonable probability of
substantial injury to competition. Although Professor Oppenheim
reads that dismissal as an adoption of a rule of reason test of section
3 of the Clayton Act in section 5 cases, it appears more likely to be a
rule of reason test derived from section 5, i.e., a decision to measure
the burden of proof in section 5 jurisdictional deficiency cases by the
section 5 standard rather than adopting the proper standard from
the specific Clayton Act section.
In his article advocating the jurisdictional deficiency standard,
Professor Oppenheim proposed taking the standard used in section 5
cases directly from the connected Clayton Act section. 94
 On the one
hand, it may be argued that specific Clayton Act standards are
designed to deal with the particular violations specified in that
statute, and that there is no reason to extend automatically these
burden of proof standards to cover activities not within the statute.
For example, without a section 5 test requiring substantial competi-
tive injury, any subsidiary transaction between two individuals who
are parties to an exclusive dealing agreement would be subject to a
section 5 charge governed by no greater standard of competitive
injury than prevailed for a "lease . . . sale or contract for sale of .. .
commodities." It may be that certain subsidiary transactions, not
within the quoted statutory phrase, are subject to sufficiently differ-
ent justifications to warrant individual tests of competitive injury,
rather than tests borrowed from related statutory prohibitions. On
the other hand, it may be argued that activities, outside of the
statutory language but within the reach of section 5 under the
jurisdictional deficiency doctrine, do not differ from those activities
explicitly prohibited in section 3 or section 7 in any way relating to
anti-competitive effect or economic justification; and therefore that
they should be subject to the same burden of proof as their Clayton
Act counterparts. This approach, for example, would subject exclu-
sive dealing contracts for services to a Standard Stations test, 95 and
92
 56 F.T.C. 456 (1959).
93 56 F.T.C. 1209 (1960).
94 Oppenheim, supra note 88, at 836-37. In jurisdictional deficiency cases, Professor
Oppenheim advocates adhering to the burden of proof fur anti-competitive effects used in
Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases for activities which, but for the jurisdictional deficiency,
would have been within those sections. The opposing view would employ a rule of reason test
in § 5 jurisdictional deficiency cases. Oppenheim avoids dealing with the dilemma with regard
to § 3 of the Clayton Act by interpreting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320 (1961), as restoring the Maico (Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953)) rule of reason burden as
the test for exclusive dealing agreements. Oppenheim, supra note 88, at 847.
95
 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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a horizontal merger between unincorporated businesses to the same
guidelines and judicial tests which govern corporate mergers.
Thus, the foregoing analysis supports the conclusion that,
within the subject matter sphere of the Sherman Act and sections 3
and 7 of the Clayton Act, the only proper role for the broad
prohibition of section 5 against unfair methods of competition is as a
tool for reaching anti-competitive practices economically equivalent
to those proscribed by the Clayton Act, but not covered by the
Clayton Act because of the technical limitations of section 3 and 7.
IV. IMPACT OF SECTION 5 UPON THE LAW OF
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The extension of section 5 to cover activities within the subject
matter sphere of the Robinson-Patman Act raises not only the issues
encountered above, but also problems unique to and inherent in
price discrimination law. Consequently, an analysis of the relation-
ship between section 5 and the Robinson-Patman Act provides an
example of the need to reconcile the various antitrust laws to pro-
mote a coherent, rational antitrust policy and entails an inquiry into
•the field of price discrimination law.
The FTC frequently brings proceedings under section 5 to
attack Robinson-Patman Act violations. 96 For example, the Com-
mission has prohibited the granting of cumulative quantity
discounts, 97 discriminatory treatment of price cutters as a condition
of selling to them in the future, 98 the granting of price concessions to
favored customers who have given preferred display position to the
seller's products, 99 the granting of rebates of discounts not equally
available to all competing purchasers, '°° price discrimination for the
purpose of underselling competitors'°' and the conditioning of dis-
counts on the buyer's carrying a minimum stock of the seller's
product. 102 However, where the Commission's practice of proceed-
ing under the section 5 complaint with the same standards of proof
as it would use if the case had been brought under the Robinson-
Patman Act, cannot be said to extend the Robinson-Patman Act.'° 3
96 This practice was approved in Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir.
1962).
97 Dentists' Supply Co., 37 F.T.C. 345 (1943).
98 Cream of Wheat Co, v. FTC, 14 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926).
99 Continental Baking Co., 37 F.T.C. 670 (1943).
1 " Grove Laboratories, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 664 (1957).
1°1 Crouse-Hinds Co., 46 F.T.C. 1114 (1950); Utah Wholesale Grocery, 39 F.T.C. 411
(1944).
I" Champion Spark Plugs Co., 50 F.T.C, 30 (1953).
103 A different problem arises if 5 is used as a means of framing vague and broad
charges which fail to give the respondent proper notice. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1
(1938).
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In a 1964 section 5 case,'" the FTC noted that unjustifiably
low, albeit nondiscriminatory and above marginal cost pricing,
may, if engaged in by a powerful firm, be a potent weapon of
predatory and destructive economic warfare; and hence unfair
under section 5. 1 °5 This view seems to imply that section 5 could be
extended to reach multiproduct sellers who sell in competitive and
noncompetitive markets, and who charge a uniform low, yet above
marginal cost, price for the product facing the stiffest competition.
However, aside from that FTC comment, section 5 has been applied
to extend the Robinson-Patman Act only in the areas of liability of
buyers and promotional allowances.
In a 1960 case, Grand Union Co., 1 ° 6 the Commission held that
a buyer who knowingly solicits and receives payments which are
unlawful under section 2(0° 7 is engaged in unfair methods of
competition or unfair trade practices in violation of section 5, not-
withstanding that section's silence as to buyers. The Commission
majority in Grand Union based its decision upon the theory that the
purpose of section 5 was to bolster other antitrust statutes by out-
lawing practices which violate their "spirit" but not their letter.
Since, as the Commission determined, the purpose of the
Robinson-Patman Act was to curb the use of mass purchasing
power by large buyers to gain price concessions, Grand Union's
knowing solicitation and receipt of discriminatory advertising al-
104 Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131, 1193-94 (1964). The Commission charges that the
manufacturer had violated § 5 by selling a certain grade of oat flour below cost with the
intent, purpose and effect of injuring or restraining competition. The § 5 charge was coupled
with a § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), charge. The § 2(a) charge was dismissed for
insufficient proof of adverse competitive effect because there was no showing that the cost of
the oat flour was a significant element in the price of the finished product. 66 F.T.C. at 1193.
In dismissing the charge, after finding that the record did not indicate predatory or
otherwise unfair conduct, the Commission noted that selling at unjustifiably low prices,
though nondiscriminatory and not below cost (the Commission referred to "actual" cost and
"cost of manufacture," leaving it uncertain as to whether the relevant figure is to be long-run
or short-run, marginal or average, cost) may, if engaged in by a powerful firm, be a potent
weapon of predatory and destructive economic warfare, especially where such sales are
subsidized by profits from other product markets where the seller faced relatively weak
competition. The difficulties inherent in extending § 5 to cover this type of multiproduct firm
pricing policy are discussed in text at notes 181-184 infra.
LOS Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131 (1964). The Commission noted the absence of any
evidence of predatory or other unfair conduct.
i° 6 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960).
1 ° 7
 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1970). Section 2(d) prohibits the provision of discriminatory
promotional allowances to a buyer. Section 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1970), prohibits dis-
criminatory articles or facilities furnished by the buyer to the seller. Both sections are aimed at
discriminations given in connection with the resale of the supplier's product, and are per se in
the sense that competitive injury need not be shown and the defenses provided in § 2(a), 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), are not fully available. Unless otherwise noted, the analysis below of
the buyer-inducement promotional allowance cases and indirect customer case applies to both
§ 2(d) and § 2(e), even though only one section may be explicitly mentioned.
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lowances was a violation of section 5. 1 " Furthermore, since section
5 was used to reach an integral part of a transaction which was per
se illegal as to sellers (the granting of promotional allowances im-
plies the receipt of promotional allowances, and vice versa), in order
to fulfill the policies of section 2(d) the same standard of per se
liability should be applied to the buyers.
The Second Circuit affirmed in Grand Union. 109 The court,
although noting the possibility of misuse of section 5 and recognizing
the fear that the "spirit" of the Robinson-Patman Act could "haunt
the antitrust laws, emerging wraithlike when the, Commission utters
the incantation 'section 5,' ""° nevertheless concluded that such
fears were misplaced in the Grand Union case for two reasons: (1) it
was evident from the legislative history that the omission of buyers
from section 2(d) was more "inadvertant" than "studious;" and (2)
no previously legal transaction was being suddenly transformed into
an antitrust violation. However, the court did acknowledge the
existence of a distinction between a buyer and a seller engaged in
receiving or granting advertising allowances: unlike the seller, the
buyer has no control over ensuring that the payments are
proportionate."' The seller possesses all the data which the buyer
would need to determine whether in fact the advertising allowances
were available to his competitors on proportionally equal terms. For
that reason, the section 5 complaint was appropriately limited to
"knowing" receipt or inducement of disproportionate payments. 12
The dissent,' 13 following the points made by Commissioner Tait's
dissent below, 14 objected to the judicial and Commission-made
legislation of the Grand Union case, and claimed that by such use of
section 5, the court and the Commission makes ex post facto laws,
renders specific antitrust statutes superfluous, and expands the area
of per se Robinson-Patman Act prohibitions without regard to the
broader policies of the antitrust laws. 15
Although the Commission did not explicitly make the an-
Ms In its affirmance, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also laid emphasis on
the fact that the benefits which Grand Union obtained came to it by virtue of its large size,
and the practice was therefore directly contrary to the congressional aim, in enacting the
Robinson-Patman Act, of protecting small businesses. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d
92, 99 (2d Cir. 1962).
1 ° 9 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
II° Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted).
111
 Id. at 100.
112 The court explicitly did not reach the question of whether inducement, absent
receipt, of illegal payments, could cause a buyer to violate § 5 even though there was no seller
violation of § 2(d). 300 F.2d at 96 n.4. Cf. American News Co. v, FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
113 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
"" 57 F.T.C. 382, 426 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
113 300 F.2d at 102, 104 (dissenting opinion).
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nouncement until 1964," 6 its success in Grand Union marked the
beginning of a new enforcement policy: given a highly competitive
industry with few buyers and many sellers, slight product differenti-
ation, and the presence of discriminatory promotional allowances,
the FTC would, proceed under section 5 against buyers rather than
under sections 2(d) or 2(e) against sellers. In Max Factor & Co. " 7
the Commission dismissed, without adjudication, charges of viola-
tions of section 2(d) on the ground that the respondents were only
two of a very large number of suppliers participating in the special
promotional events initiated by a large retailer; and as such, an
order entered against only the respondents would be inequitable.
The inequity lay (1) in the fact that, given the market structure
described, proceedings against suppliers were unlikely to be brought
against all suppliers" 8
 (with the possible outcome of a buyer dealing
with some suppliers who are enjoined from participating in promo-
tional programs in which their competitors still participate); (2) in the
difficult position the large buyer-small supplier relationship placed
the supplier. The supplier was faced with the choice of joining the
promotional program and risking a section 2(d) or a section 2(e)
charge, or refusing to join the promotion thus losing shelf space in
the buyer's outlet and the future good will of the buyer. The Com-
mission concluded that it would be more economical and equitable,
to proceed against the buyer' 19 in such special buyer-initiated pro-
motional programs.
The emergence of the Max Factor doctrine has been substan-
tiated by a line of cases' developing the basic factual elements
required to establish a violation of section 5 through knowing in-
ducement and receipt of an allowance in violation of section 2(d). 121
"° Max Factor & Co., 66 F.T.C. 184 (1964).
" 7 Id.
18 Even if the Commission could proceed simultaneously against all involved suppliers,
a large buyer could easily turn to alternate suppliers.
19 Commissioner MacIntyre, without concurring in the result, enigmatically stated that
he agreed that an appropriate proceeding under § 5 would be a better means for challenging
such practices than a § 2(d) action against a seller. Max Factor & Co., 66 F.T.C. 184, 251
(1964).
' 20 See, e.g., Colonial Stores v. FTC, 450 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1971); Fred Meyer, Inc. v.
FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); R.H. Macy &
Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Alterman Foods, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 298 (1973); Kroger Co.,
Doc. No. C-2453, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 20,396, at 20,278 (1973); Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
Doc. No. C-2427, 3 Trade Rep. ¶ 20,365, at 20,256 (1973); Furr's Inc., 68 F.T.C. 584 (1965);
J. Weingarten, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1521 (1963), aff'd on other grounds, 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965).
121 In J. Weingarten, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1521 (1963), appealed on other grounds, 336 F.2d
687 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit approved the list of necessary factual elements for a buyer-inducement charge set forth
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Evidence that a buyer had a position of near dominance in its field,
had insisted on sharply increased rebates, and had met with resis-
tance from publishers who protested and evidence that the rebates
far exceeded those granted to competitors, combined with the fact
that no competitor received proportionally equal allowances, sup-
ports a finding that the buyer knew or should have known of the
disproportionality of the payments."'
R.H. Macy's 100th Anniversary Sale provided the opportunity
for further elucidation of the elements necessary to or sufficient for a
Grand Union -type violation. The nature of the promotional allow-
ance and the content of the requirement that such allowance be in
connection with the resale of a supplier's procuct were examined in
R.N. Macy & Co. v. FTC. 123 Holding that solicitation of contribu-
tions from suppliers by a buyer as large as Macy's was inherently
oppressive and coercive, and that such activity contravened the
spirit of the Robinson-Patman Act and hence violated section 5, the
court relied upon a broad reading of section 2(d). The section was
applied even though the payments were made solely for institutional
publicity and Macy rendered no services for the suppliers. 124 How-
ever, the court did draw a distinction between payments by a
supplier to a buyer who merely pocketed the money (a section 2(a)
violation) and a supplier who used the payments for institutional
advertising and promotions in order to attract more people into the
store. In the latter case, the court reasoned, more people in the store
meant more purchases of all goods which included more purchases
of the supplier's goods, thus satisfying the "in connection with"
requirement of the statute.
Although neither section 5 nor section 2(d) make reference to
by the Commission. 336 F.2d at 693 n.16. These elements were: (1) solicitation and receipt by
a buyer of payments for promotional services in connection with the resale of the supplier's
product; (2) a product of like grade and quality as that sold to competing buyers; (3) failure to
affirmatively offer payments (from the seller) to competing customers on proportionately equal
terms; and (4) proof that the buyer knew or should have known that the payments were not
being made available to competitors on proportionately equal terms.
112 See American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824
(1962). The court limited the cease and desist order to•nducement and receipt—mere attempt
to induce illegal payments, without receipt thereof, has not been held to violate § 5, by either
the courts or the Commission.
155 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
114
 The R.H. Macy court examined the House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports,
explaining the practices at which section 2(d) was aimed:
Such an allowance becomes unjust when the service is not rendered as agreed and
paid for, or when if rendered, the payment is grossly in excess of its value, or when
in any case the customer is deriving from it equal benefit to his own business and is
thus enabled to shift to his vendor substantial portions of his own advertising cast,
while his smaller competitor, unable to command such allowances, cannot do so.
Id. at 448 (quoting from H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1936); S. Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936)) (emphasis added by court).
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knowledge, the Commission has imported language from section 2(f)
into its FTCA section 5 complaints against buyer-inducement of
promotional allowances. 125 In ascertaining whether the buyer had
knowledge, the courts have cited Automatic Canteen Co. of America
v. FTC' 26 as setting the standard, but have then quickly read that
case as providing the Commission with great leeway' 27 in meeting
its burden of proof; 128 arguably even more leeway than that permit-
ted in section 2(f) cases.' 29 Along these lines, it has been held that
lack of knowledge is not a defense if it appears that such lack of
knowledge is culpable."° Rather, looking at the record as a whole,
the court will examine the evidence presented by the Commission to
determine whether the purchaser, at the time of inducement and
receipt, possessed enough information to be subject to a duty of
inquiry to determine whether the payments were available to com-
petitors on proportionally equal terms."'
There is some indication that the Commission desires to use
section 5 to place an even heavier burden of disclosure upon pur-
chasers by requiring them to disclose the material information con-
cerning prices and allowances offered by suppliers. This disclosure
would be required to be made to suppliers from whom a lower price
or allowance is being sought, at least when the induced supplier
indicates that his offer is designed to meet competition. It is not
sufficient that the seller had indicated that the promotion at issue
125 See, e.g., Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 186 (D.C. Dir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 910 (1963).
126 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
127 E.g., Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 910 (1963); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1962). But see
American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
' is See Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79-80 (1953) (trade
experience as sufficient basis for knowledge).
The fact situations in which § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970), cases most frequently arise
appear to be more conducive to a higher degree of knowledge than § 5 cases of the
buyer-inducement-promotional allowance cases. This is probably due to the greater certainty
with which prices can be known and evaluated as compared with promotional allowances.
See cases cited in note 129 infra.
129
 See, e.g., General Auto Supplies, Inc., v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 923 (1965); Mid-South Distributors v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961); American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
'" Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 910 (1963).
131 307 F.2d at 187. The Commission explicitly stated in Furr's, Inc., 68 F.T.C. 584
(1965), that the absence of an inquiry by the buyer of the seller does not prevent the
Commission from finding that the buyer knew or should have known, where the record shows
facts sufficient to put the buyer on notice that he was requesting a special allowance. Id. at
683-90. The Commission expressed no opinion as to what effect the fact that the buyer had
made an inquiry of the seller and received an affirmative answer (to the effect that propor-
tionally equal payments were being offered to the buyer's competitors) would have upon a
finding that the buyer knew or should have known otherwise.
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will be available to competitors at some undisclosed time in the
future, e.g., on their one hundredth birthday, the promotional al-
lowance must be available on proportionally equal terms to all
competitors at the same time. 132 The evidence in the Giant Food
case indicated that the promotional plan was buyer-initiated, inde-
pendent of existing promotional allowances, involved payments dis-
proportionately higher than those offered under existing promotional
plans, and was so vaguely worded as to make it difficult for a
supplier to offer proportionally equal benefits to his competing
customers.' 33 The court held that this fact situation, common to
buyer-initiated promotional programs, was sufficient to support the
Commission's finding of buyer knowledge.
The Commission has indicated that in buyer-inducement cases
it will hold buyers to the standard of knowledge of a reasonable and
prudent businessman.' 34 However, as yet there is little guidance as
to how a reasonable and prudent businessman should fulfill the
buyer's duty of inquiry. The Commission has held that a statement
on the buyer's promotional contract form, which was signed (albeit
one month after the allowances were granted) by virtually all sup-
pliers and which asserted that the "same agreement is made avail-
able by the Vendor on a proportionally equal basis to all dealers in
the competitive area who purchase products herein satisfied," did
not satisfy the buyer's duty of inquiry nor negate its inducement.' 35
Language in Colonial Stores indicated that in this area, factual
findings rather than legal principles will be determinative. Hence
the courts most likely will place a great deal of weight upon the
determination made by the Commission.' 36
Two recent cases, Alterman Foods, Inc)." and Foremost-
McKesson, Inc., 138 demonstrate the Commission's willingness to
apply section 5 to inducement cases involving a buyer operating at
both the wholesale and retail levels. The respondents in both cases
had sponsored trade shows in connection with which they had
induced their suppliers to participate and to pay booth rentals. The
132
 See FTC Advisory Opinion, No. 288, Receipt of Promotional Allowance without
Concurrent Availability to Competitors, 74 F.T.C. 1668 (Sept. 6, 1968) (digest).
133 Giant Food Co. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
910 (1963).
134
 FTC Advisory Opinion, No. 288, Receipt of Promotional Allowance without Concur-
rent Availability to Competitors, 74 F.T.C, 1668 (Sept, 6, 1968) (digest).
133 [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 19,248, at 21,417 (FTC 1970). The
examiner characterized the buyer's forms as a "'meaningless self-serving declaration obtained
by the respondent [buyer] and worthy of no weight.' " Id.
136 Insofar as the credibility of the buyer is at issue, as it would tend to be in determining
state of mind and good faith effort to discharge a duty of inquiry, the Commission will in turn
give great weight to the findings of the examiner.
132 [1970-73 Transfer Hinder] Trade Reg. Rep. 	 20,248, at 22,259 (FTC 1973).
I" 3 Trade Reg. Rep,	 20,365, at 20,256 (FTC 1973) (consent order).
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FTC's decisions and consent orders attacked these inducements on
the ground that they were not available to competing customers,
including those customers who bought from the suppliers through
intermediaries. As a result of these actions, firms acting as dual
distributors must now identify their competitors at each level and
insure that wholesalers, direct-buying retailers and indirect-buying
retailers receive proportionally equal promotional allowances. A
second result of these cases has been an expanded reading of the "in
connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering for sale"
requirement of sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The FTC concluded that the sales presentations at the trade shows
(attended by retail customers and their guests) benefited the respon-
dents' retail divisions and indirectly facilitated sales to the consum-
ing public. These cases seem to indicate the intention of the Com-
mission to use section 5 as an elastic clause to expand the restrictive
language of the Robinson-Patman Act. 139
V. AN EVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND SECTION 5
The Robinson-Patman Act, like the Clayton Act, is a precisely
drawn statute aimed at specific types of practices which cause
competitive injury by substantially lessening competition or by tend-
ing to create a monopoly. Because of this loose competitive injury
test and its specific language, it might appear reasonable to use
section 5 in the same manner in the Robinson-Patman Act area as in
Clayton Act sections 3 and 7 areas, that it, to fill in the gaps where
activities covered by the policy of the Act fall outside of its proscrip-
tions because of technical limitations. However, the problem can-
not be resolved that simply. The Robinson-Patman Act is aimed not
only at price discrimination tending to injure competition, but also
at price discrimination which has a tendency to injure competitors.
Practices which are pro-competitor are not necessarily pro-
competition—a fact responsible for much of the tension in the
Robinson-Patman area. These two policies are often in conflict and
thus sacrifice of one may be required in order to further the objec-
tives of the other.
It would not be consistent with the policy of the statute to
extend the Robinson-Patman Act where practices similar to those
prohibited by the Act, but outside its, technical confines, may sub-
stantially restrain competition. Such an approach ignores the policy
behind that part of the Robinson-Patman Act which is aimed at
139 Another recent complaint, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 11 19,639 at 21,685 is discussed in text infra following note 196.
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protecting competitors.'" It is this internal conflict of statutory
purposes which requires a different approach to the use of section 5
in the Robinson-Patman Act area ; than in the Clayton Act area.
As mentioned above, the Commission has applied section 5 to
extend sections 2(d), 2(e), and 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Sections 2(d) and (e) play an integral part in implementing the
overall policy of the Robinson-Patmen Act "to curb and prohibit all
devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences
over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power. )5141
Prior to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, congressional
concern had focused on the buying practices of large retailers of and
the preferential treatment accorded to large retailers. 142 Especially
noticed was the practice of inducing price discrimination in the form
of advertising and promotional allowances.'" However, the only
provision of the Robinson-Patman Act addressed to buyers merely
dealt with inducements to discriminatory prices and did not mention
discriminatory allowances or services.
The Act has been limited further by the Commission's insis-
tence upon interpreting each subsection of the Robinson-Patman Act
separately, rather than reading the Act as a whole. 144 The Commis-
sion has read sections 2(c), (d) and (e) as per se prohibitions. Thus,
injury to competition need not be proved and the usual price dis-
crimination defenses of section 2(a) are not available. 145 Likewise,
the Commission has sharply distinguished between those sections
and sections 2(a) and (f), and has refused to combine them to
produce an integrated statute, possibly due to the differences in
standard of proof. A tradition of reading the Robinson-Patman Act
' 4° The purpose of this legislation is to restore, so far as possible, equality of
opportunity in business by strengthening the antitrust laws and by protecting trade
and commerce against unfair trade practices and unlawful price discrimination, and
also against restraint and monopoly for the better protection of consumers, workers,
and independent producers, manufacturers, merchants, and other businessmen.
H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
141
 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
142 See, e.g., FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57-65 (1935); C. Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under
the Robinson-Patman Act 6-11 (2d rev. ed. 1959).
143 See FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 44-46, 78-82 (1935); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); H.R. Rep. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1936).
144
 Automatic Canteen Co, of America v, FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 71, 76-77 (1953).
145
 To be sure, there is evidence that it may have been the legislative intent to treat
indirect price discrimination, such as brokerage and promotional allowances, differently, for
there were continual references to the §§ 2(c), (d), and (e) practices as "secret" discriminations.
See 80 Cong. Rec. 8126, 8127, 8132, 8135, 8137, 8226 (1936). Nonetheless, among those
commentators who would not do away with the Robinson-Patman Act entirely, there is strong
support for abolishing § 2(c) and incorporating §§ 2(d) and (e) into § 2(a)'s prohibition against
indirect price discrimination. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 64-67,
rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959).
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as a whole most likely would have led the Commission to proceed
against buyer-induced discrimination under section 2(f) on the as-
sumption that the prohibitions of sections 2(d) and (e) were included
in section 2(f)'s "discrimination in price." Instead, the policy of
nonintegrated statutory interpretation has been a strong force in the
developing reliance on section 5 of the FTCA.
An examination of two types of Robinson-Patman Act exten-
sions, the indirect-customer doctrine and the buyer-induced promo-
tional allowances, and the approaches taken by the Commission and
the courts to each is revealing. The Commission and the courts
appear to be more willing to read the Robinson-Patman Act broadly
and without resort to section 5 where the issue can be narrowed to
one section of the Act, as in the cases espousing the indirect-
customer doctrine. ' 46 However, where the activity conceivably re-
quired a combination of two sections of the Act to justify the
complaint, section 5 of the FTCA has been pressed into service.
The Robinson-Patman Act, prior to Grand Union and Fred
Meyer, had not been interpreted to include either: (1) buyers who
induced discriminatory promotional allowances or (2) buyers who
did not purchase directly from the seller or subject to seller control
over price or terms of sale. 147 In Grand Union and its related line of
cases,'" the Commission resorted to the "unfair method of competi-
tion" language of section 5, while in Fred Meyer the Supreme Court
reached the indirect buyers by directly extending section 2(d). 149 In
the latter case, the Court adopted the rationale of the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Elman.'" The Commissioner argued that
sellers who grant price and promotional allowances to direct-buying
retailers must grant proportionally equal allowances to competing
indirect-buying retailers rather than simply to the direct-buying
retailers or wholesalers. This extension of the word "purchaser" to
include retailers remote from the manufacturer requires the lan-
guage of the Robinson-Patman Act to be stretched little less than the
buyer-inducement cases require. However, because of the estab-
lished approach of reading each prohibition of the Robinson-Patman
Act independently of each other prohibition, the section 5 approach
was employed in the latter cases.
146
 See, e.g., FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
147
 Previously, the indirect purchaser doctrine had been limited to transactions in which
the seller exercised substantial control over the terms upon which the buyer purchased. See,
e.g., Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1969); Klein v. Lionel
Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956); Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
' 4° See cases cited in note 124 supra.
149 390 U.S. at 348, 352.
14° Id. at 355, following Fred Meyer, Inc., 63 F.T.C. 1, 74 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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Closer examination of the Grand Union line of cases fails to
reveal any radical extension of the Robinson-Patman Act as a result
of the utilization of section 5 in reaching buyer-inducement of pro-
motional allowances. Such use of section 5 has not resulted in the
creation of a new substantive antitrust violation but rather in the
application of an established rule against another party to an
already-prohibited practice. There is no indication in the legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act that buyers ought to be immune
from the restrictions embodied in section 2(d).
Generally, the fact that a purchaser can induce and receive
allowances or services not available to his competitors indicates the
presence of a degree of market power in that purchaser. Presum-
ably, the induced allowance or service will provide the purchaser
with a further advantage over competitors. The acquisition of com-
petitive advantages by one already in possession of a degree of
market power widens the gap between the competitive viability of
the large and small competitors, and tends to eliminate the less
viable. Thus, a more concentrated market may be produced. It was
exactly such a process which the draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman
Act sought to prevent. Therefore, if the facts of a particular instance
of price discrimination indicate that the effect of the inducement is
more than insubstantial, it should fall within the prohibition of
section 5 as conditioned by the Robinson-Patman Act. Furthermore,
inducement of discriminatory prices and promotional allow-
ances may, at least in a concentrated market, result in the recip-
ient being free from pressure to pass on any savings to customers.
The same result may occur even in a non-concentrated market,
provided the inducing supplier is large enough and cautious enough
to induce secret allowances from his suppliers. Both these factors
increase the likelihood that inducement of discriminatory allowances
will be anti-competitive in the manner envisioned by the framers of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
Further evidence that Grand Union represented an appropriate
case for the application of section 5 lies in the fact that the practice
which is explicitly forbidden by section 2(d) requires the participa-
tion of two parties, a buyer and a seller. As long as the buyer is
cognizant of the discriminatory nature of his allowance, holding him
liable under section 5 hardly creates a totally new offense. In the
case of a large-volume buyer, it may be more equitable and effective
to attack the practices from the buyer's rather than the seller's
end.' 5 ' Section 2(d) was aimed at covert price discrimination dis-
guised as advertising allowances. Inasmuch as its prohibitions were
' 3 ' See the discussion 'of the Max Factor doctrine in text following notes 117 supra.
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made absolute, a prima fade case of violation does not depend on a
showing of competitive injury. 152
Since the requirement that promotional allowances be made
available to all competitors on proportionally equal terms was im-
posed not to punish sellers for granting any promotional allowances
but rather to protect a large buyer's competitors, the per se prohibi-
tion in section 2(d) arguably should apply with equal force whether
the proceeding is brought against a buyer or a seller. However,
assuming both the desirability of encouraging buyers to seek advan-
tageous terms and the practical difficulties which confront a buyer
seeking to discover the allowances which his seller has granted
competing buyers, it is difficult to justify the adoption of a per se
rule. The fuzziness of the policies involved in holding buyers liable
is evidenced by an evaluation of the burdens the Commission would
require an inducing buyer to satisfy. For example, as a result of the
Fred Meyer decision and the Advertising Guides,'" a buyer who is
both a wholesaler and a retailer must insure that all his competitors
(wholesalers, direct and indirect-buying retailers, cooperatives) re-
ceive advertising allowances which equal the cost to them of mount-
ing advertising programs similar to that mounted by the buyer who
originally sought the allowance. 154 The seller's burden of guarantee-
ing that his indirect customers receive benefits equivalent to those
granted to his direct customers is slight in comparison with the
burden upon a buyer presumed to be dealing at arm's length with
the seller whose records he seeks. It should be noted that these are
records of allowances granted his competitors.' 55
It is disturbing that the Commission, in the buyer-inducement
of advertising allowance cases, applied section 5 not as the result of
its own conclusion that the prohibited conduct was sufficiently
anti-competitive or anti-competitor to conflict with the policies in
the Robinson-Patman Act, but rather on the basis that the conduct
constituted a per se violation of a congressional mandate, the spirit
of the Robinson-Patman Act.'" Section 5 of the FTCA was de-
' 32
 Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 360 U.S. 55, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959).
' 53
 FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240 (1974).
154
 See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
	 20,365, at 20,256 (FTC
1973).
155
 Per se rules should not be applied unless it is clear that the situation is one unlikely to
be justifiable. That this is no longer the case in the area of promotional allowances, given the
indirect-purchaser and buyer-inducement extensions of that area, can be seen by applying the
Guides to prices rather than simply allowances, or even to price promotions without any
performance required in connection with the price allowance. Applying the Advertising
Guides, the seller would be responsible for insuring that his wholesaler's customers pay the
same price as his direct-buying customers of the same level. The result would be a system of
resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972).
' 56
 For example, in Max Factor, 66 F.T.C. 184 (1964), the Commission perceptively
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signed specifically to provide the Commission with the flexibility
necessary to apply its administrative expertise in the determination
of what constitutes unfair methods of competition. Although the
results were proper in the buyer-inducement cases, a blind following
of so-called legislative mandates without analysis of the competitive
implications of pricing practices could result in undesirable en-
forcement policies, and mocks the Commission's expertise and
function.'" In the future this could well result in a Commission
chasing "wraithlike" Robinson-Patman spirits rather than pursuing
those violations with more substantive effects on competition and
competitors. The question of the propriety of using section 5 of the
FTCA to extend the Robinson-Patman Act obviously encompasses
more than the buyer-inducement cases of the 1960's.
VI. A MODEL FOR THE USE OF SECTION 5 As A
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SUPPLEMENT
A. Judicial Legislation
Extending the scope of a statute, either by means of a broad
reading of its own language or by means of a mandate contained in
another related statute, is a powerful tool of judicial legislation.
This latter term is not used pejoratively. On the contrary, it is the
responsibility of a principled judiciary to apply the tools of legal
reasoning and analysis to the statute before it in order to give effect
to the statutory purpose and to harmonize that statute with the
surrounding statutory and common law framework. However, the
aggressiveness with which the judiciary pursues a statutory policy
should be a function of the clarity with which the legislature has
expressed that policy. 158
B. The Structure of the Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act was a product of legislative com-
promise, a marriage between the Clayton Act and an anti-chain-
store bill. 159 Thus, it reflects not one strong policy but rather a
noted that in a buyer-inducement case, where the buyer has induced the non-proportional
allowances, thus creating a situation in which the sellers have a good faith meeting of
competition defense, it would be "anomalous and destructive of statutory policy" to read
Automatic Canteen, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), as providing a defense for the buyer. Max Factor Co.,
66 F.T.C. at 251 n.4.
1" The need for the Commission to develop procedures compatible with its broad
administrative function rather than relying on judicially-conceived rules of practice is dis-
cussed in Dingell, Dingell Report on the Federal Trade Commission's Enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 3 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 53 (1970).
' 5 " For example, in interpreting the Sherman Act, the courts have found a very clear
legislative intent and have thus continually extended the coverage of the Act.
159 See Note, The Robinson-Patman ACt in Action, 46 Yale L.J. 447, 448-50 (1937).
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combination of elements of two policies. Preventing the type of
harms inherent in secondary line injury (injury among competitors
of the customers receiving the discriminatory price) may result in
authorizing practices which have unfavorable primary line effects
(effects on competition among competitors of the initiator of the
discriminatory price), and vice versa. The meeting competition
defense (§2(b)) provides both a cogent illustration of the dilemma
and a resolution of the issue. By establishing this defense, Congress
made the value judgment that the secondary line injury to unfa-
vored purchasers was outweighed by the primary line injury which
a seller would face if he could not lower his price to meet a
competing offer.
There is no simple relationship between antitrust policy, as
contained in the Robinson-Patman Act, and economic theory. The
tensions present in the Act cannot therefore be resolved by economic
analysis without careful reference to the congressional purposes in
enacting this price discrimination legislation. 16° It is for this reason
that the Commission and the courts must proceed with caution in
extending the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Act itself contains elements of policy reconciliation result-
ing from an attempt to distinguish between destructive price dis-
crimination and competitive price discrimination.'" Section 2(a)
160
 For the view that the Robinson-Patman Act, as administered, operates to restrain
vigorous price competition and also victimizes the smaller firm, see Rowe, The Federal Trade
Commission's Administration of the Anti-Price Discrimination Law—A Paradox of Antitrust
Policy, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 415 (1964).
161
 The Supreme Court gave similar advice to the Commission and lower courts in FTC
v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963): "In appraising the effects of any price cut or the
corresponding response to it, both the Federal Trade Commission and the courts must make
realistic appraisals of relevant competitive facts. Invocation of mechanical word formulas
cannot be made to substitute for adequate probative analysis." Id. at 527.
In distinguishing between desirable and undesirable price variations, the focus should be
upon price discrimination, rather than upon mere price differences, taking costs into account.
Only those prices which reflect economic price discrimination should be a target of an
antitrust policy which has as one of its aims efficient allocation of resources through a
competitively-structured economy. Given a price discrimination, it must then be examined to
see at what level the discrimination operates: whether the discrimination is likely to injure
competition among competitors of the initiator of the discriminatory prices (primary line
injury), or among competitors of the customers receiving the discriminatory price (secondary
line injury), or at both levels. This determination is related to the nature of the competitive
injury: is it injury to competition (in the broad sense) or to competitors? The former leads to
damage akin to that caused by monopolization while the latter may be limited to damage to
business opportunities for a few firms, involving standards of fairness in addition to antitrust
concepts. Injury to competitors in the primary line may well be caused by competition which
is "fair." Unless the lower price is below marginal cost, or unless so many sellers are driven
out of the business that, in view of the power and purpose of the seller, a continuation of the
discrimination would be inconsistent with the healthy continuation of a competitive market,
the practice does not possess the requisite degree of unfairness necessary to fall within the
policy of section 5. On the secondary line, however, injury to competitors represents a more
substantial claim for section 5 protection. If, as is usually the case, the favored customer is a
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prohibits only that price discrimination which substantially lessens
competition, tends to create a monopoly, or injures, destroys or
prevents competition with any. competitor. Meeting competition and
cost justification defenses were provided to enable competitors to
survive during price wars and to take advantage of economic
efficiencies. Brokerage and promotional payments, considered in-
vidious practices used to conceal price discrimination, accordingly
were made subject to strict per se prohibitions. This framework is
the proper reference point for responsible expansion of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Careful analysis of the anti-competitive ef-
fects of a practice is necessary to determine whether a practice
should be declared illegal subject to a rule of reason analysis and the
full array of the statutory defenses, or whether one of the existing
per se rules should be extended to include the practice. 162 Failure to
give proper weight to the various policies and elements contained
within the Act can too easily result in the underlying rationale being
lost if the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibitions is
broadened beyond that reasonably defined by its language.
C. The Role of Section 5
Given the problems inherent in the Robinson-Patman Act, "the
wiser course for th[e] [Supreme] Court [would be] to hew as closely
as possible to the wandering line that the statute has drawn (with
due deference to the expertise of the Commission charged with
enforcing this statute). . ." 163 However, the FTC is also charged
with enforcing section 5 of the FTCA which prohibits unfair
methods of competition. Thus, an important issue is presented: the
nature of the relation between the broad mandate of section 5 and
larger customer, persistent, non-cost-justified price discrimination (direct or indirect) is likely
to lead to a less competitive market structure on the buyer's side, On the other hand, it is also
likely to be in the interest of competition on the seller's level to permit the seller to adjust
prices according to market conditions, to clear the market,
The structure of the market and the identity of the price discriminatiir is likewise
important. Discrimination practiced by a relatively small firm or a new entrant into the
market is unlikely to have an adverse effect upon competition, If, for example, the dis-
criminator is a member of an oligopolistic market of a recently broken-up cartel such price
discrimination represents shading and is a move toward, not away from, a competitive pricing
system. See, e.g., W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly 83 (1966).
The criteria sketched briefly above, though by no means exhaustive, indicate the lines
along which analysis of anti-competitive effect should proceed, and indicate the types of
anti-competitive conduct (persistent, significant, discriminatory, below marginal cost pricing,
and inducement by large buyers of non-cost-justified allowances) at which the Robinson-
Patman Act was aimed.
162 See Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 625
(1966). Commissioner Elman warned that improper extension of the antitrust laws may result
in their becoming "quaint, breathtakingly subtle and logical, but of little contemporary
relevance." Id. at 634.
163 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 360 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the specifically-focused Robinson-Patman Act. The canon of statu-
tory construction mandating that statutes in part materia—statutes
relating to a common end—should be construed together, will not
let the Robinson-Patman Act rest in peace. Thus the various anti-
trust statutes and section 5 of the FTCA which are aimed at the
promotion of vigorous competition, should be construed together
in order to create a- coherent expression of national antitrust
policy. 164 Furthermore, as discussed above, it was the intent of
Congress in creating the FTC to endow it with a sufficiently flexible
and dynamic mandate to permit it to function effectively despite the
accelerating changes in the nation's commercial practices. The
Commission is endowed with a wide discretion in determining the
type of order necessary to end the unfair practice found,'" and
must be able to close all alternative avenues leading to the prohib-
ited goal. 166
 In light of these considerations, any arbitrary attempt
to prevent the Commission from reaching Robinson-Patman Act-
type practices under section 5 would be to misinterpret the scope of
authority which Congress, in enacting the FTCA, delegated to the
Commission.
D. Methods of Reconciliation
There are four main theories which are currently advanced by
the Commission, courts and commentators and which seek to define
the proper scope of the Commission's power to extend the
Robinson-Patman Act under section 5.' 67
The courts have followed the "policy" or "spirit" test, which
permits section 5 to extend the Robinson-Patman Act by outlawing
activities which violate its spirit but not its letter. 168 The poten-
tialities and pitfalls of this approach were discussed above.'" Be-
cause the cases in which the Commission or courts have promul-
gated this theory involved promotional allowances which are prac-
tices subject to a per se Robinson-Patman prohibition, the extension
has developed into a "per se knowledge" rule. As mentioned earlier,
justifying new per se rules by a tool as nebulous as the policy or
Li' See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953): "Although
due consideration is to be accorded to administrative construction where alternative interpre-
tation is fairly open, it is our duty to reconcile such interpretation, except where Congress has
told us not to, .with the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress." Id.
at 74.
165
 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946). But see Heater v. FTC, 503
F.2d 321 (9th Cir, 1974).
166 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
167 The theories were in fact developed to apply to the antitrust laws in general, but for
the purposes of the remainder of this paper, the discussion will be limited to their application
to the Robinson-Patman Act field.
I" Grand Union v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
109 See discussion in Part V supra.
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spirit test runs the risk of upsetting the congressionally-established
balance of policies contained in the Robinson-Patman Act.
A second theory is based upon the "general subject matter"
approach of Professor Handler: "[W]here Congress has spoken on the
general subject but what it has said does not go as far as the
Commission would like," the Commission should not find practices
within that general subject to be unfair methods of competition. 17 °
The difficulty with this theory lies in the scope to be given to the
term "general subject." For example, a difficult issue is whether
Congress, in the Robinson-Patman Act, has spoken on the general
subject of price discrimination, or merely on the subject of price
discrimination in the sale of commodities."'
A third theory has been advocated by Professor Oppenheim.
His position is that: "[O]n balance, the Commission has authority
under section 5 to proceed against equivalent types of practices not
within the jurisdictional bounds of the coverage specified in the
Clayton Act." 172 This "jurisdictional deficiency" doctrine suggests
that section 5 adopt the standard of proof with regard to competitive
injury which is contained in the relevant section of the Robinson-
Patman Act. There are two difficulties with this approach. First, the
equivalency concept is an easily expandable one, raising issues such
as: (1) whether it should be limited to reaching new classes of
competitors engaged in transactions explicitly prohibited by the
Robinson-Patman Act; and (2) whether the charging of the same
price for commodities of differing costs should be equivalent to the
charging of different prices for the same commodities. Second, espe-
cially in the Robinson-Patman area, distinguishing between jurisdic-
tional elements and other elements is a difficult process which, once
accomplished, is still of questionable value.'" Not only is so much
of the Robinson-Patman Act "jurisdictional," 174 but the different
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional elements bear with differing
force upon the statutory policies, i.e., some characteristics of a
particular statutory violation are more important than others. 175
17° Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Vale L.J. 75, 97-98 (1961). Handler
emphasizes that, as he reads the legislative histories, there is no requirement in either statute
that the provisions of the Clayton Act are to be merged with § 5 and lose their identity as to
the specific expression of the legislative intent on the legitimacy of the practices to which they
relate.
171 For a critique of Handler's approach, see Pearson, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as Antitrust: A Comment, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 8-11 (1967).
172 Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 835 (1961).
1” That is to say, there is no reason to assume that a "jurisdictional" element is any less
central to the policies of the statute than a "merits" element.
174 For example, the requirements of two different purchasers, two contemporaneous
sales, commodities of like grade and quality, in commerce, are all jurisdictional elements.
175 See the criticism in Pearson, supra note 172 at 11-14.
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The fourth theory resembles the theory proposed by this article
but proposes a more broad employment of section 5 of the FTCA. It
advocates the use of section 5 as an all purpose remedy for any
unfair method of competition which has, in the Commission's opin-
ion, an anti-competitive effect.' 76 In propounding this "elastic
clause" doctrine, Professor Pearson adopts a point of view appar-
ently shared by many Commission members. This viewpoint is that
section 5 is an independent source of antitrust law. However, this
approach fails to specify which practices are anti-competitive or by
which standard injury to competition should be evaluated.'" The
latter theoretical weakness is especially significant in the Robinson-
Patman area, where the formation of critical distinctions between
injury to competition and injury to competitors depends upon how
the balance between primary and secondary line injury is struck.
This author agrees with Professor Pearson's interpretation of
section 5 as a statute aimed at anti-competitive conduct. However,
when used to attack practices in the antitrust sphere, the scope of
section 5 of the FTCA should be limited by the standards developed
in the course of interpreting and enforcing the Sherman, Clayton
and Robinson-Patman Acts. The justification for declaring a par-
ticular practice an unfair method of competition available for section
5 proscription ought not to come from the viscera of the Commis-
sioners but rather from the Sherman and Clayton Acts, for it is those
statutes which provide concrete guides for antitrust policy. If the
statute focuses on specific forms of injury to competition, the anti-
competitive effects caused by the conduct sought to be made subject
to section 5 attack should be required to produce similar injury.
In price discrimination cases, the proper standard for measur-
ing the prohibited anti-competitive effects should be the degree to
which market concentration and oligopolistic conduct has increased.
In enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress recognized that the
practice of granting discriminatory prices to favored customers
(specifically chain stores) provided the customer with a competitive
advantage likely to result in the dominance of the market by those
favored customers. The ability to continue to induce discriminatory
prices would insure that smaller competitors remain in their weak
position which would in turn result in a market of few firms capable
of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic conduct. Higher, rigid prices,
. 176 See id. at 14-18.
177 Professor Pearson, while suggesting that the antitrust statutes may serve as guidelines
and may be consulted concerning standards for determining anti-competitive effect, concludes
that such reference does not indicate how anti-competitive injury is to be measured. Id. at
17-18. The approach of the present article uses the antitrust statutes as mandatory references
for determining anti-competitive effect, and balances the alleged justifications against the type
of injury with which the relevant statutory section was concerned.
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lower output, and the destruction of small competitors were the evils
motivating the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of price discrimi-
nation.'"
E. A Proposal
Analysis of the use of section 5 to reach incipient infractions
and policy violations of the Sherman, Clayton and Robinson-
Patman Acts revealed two major problems. First, section 5 was used
frequently to reach practices which, while arguably "unfair," did not
have anti-competitive effects as defined by the antitrust statutes.
Also, section 5 was used to reach practices closely resem-
bling those prohibited by the antitrust laws, but whose anti-
competitive effects were minimal or nonexistent. It is submitted that
the following proposal avoids these difficulties.
First, if a practice is already illegal under the Robinson-Patman
Act, the Commission should not attempt to reach it under section
5. 179 Due process concepts of specificity and notice favor the agency
proceeding under a specific rather than a general statute. Second, it
should be recognized that the mere exclusion of a situation from the
Robinson-Patman Act does not imply a congressional judgment that
such a situation should be privileged. There is no indication in the
legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act that Congress meant
to save each price discrimination not within its prohibitions or
condemn each practice not specifically saved by one of the provisos.
The privileged situations are defined by the defenses and provisos
explicitly contained in the Robinson-Patman Act.' 8° Having thus
removed one obstacle from the use of section 5 as a price discrimina-
tion law, it is necessary to show an affirmative justification for
reaching price discrimination practices under section 5. It is
suggested that the affirmative justification can be found in the
combination of the focus of section 5 on unfair methods of competi-
tion, the Robinson-Patman Act's requirement of a probability of a
substantial lessening of competition, and that statute's definition of
practices unreasonably restraining competition. Evidence of both
substantially increased market concentration and the resulting mar-
ket behavior provides a means of measuring the anti-competitive
injury prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act. Such evidence also
constitutes a standard by which to measure the injury prohibited by
section 5 where that provision is used in aid of the price discrimina-
178 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. Rep. No. 2951,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
179
 This includes a practice alleged to fall under the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibitions,
but the proof of which is insufficient by that Act's standards.
1 " See, e.g., the provisos of § 2(a) and the qualified proviso of § 2(b). 15 U.S.C.
§ 	 13(a),(b) (1970).
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tion prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act. Although mere injury
to competitors is an equally important focus of the Robinson-
Patman Act, such harm should be outside the reach of section 5,
except where enough competitors have been eliminated from the
market to result in a significant decrease in the competitive quality
of that market's price, output and allocation of resources. The
Robinson-Patman Act was aimed at a specific type of conduct be-
cause it tended to produce specific harms. Where the same type of
conduct, producing the same type of competitive harm, is neither
explicitly proscribed nor protected by the Robinson-Patman Act, it
should be a proper subject for attack under section 5 and the above
standards. A broader reading of section 5, in connection with anti-
trust prohibitions in general and price discrimination in particular,
would render the Sherman, Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
superfluous for purposes of FTC activity.
Admittedly, this approach places a substantial burden of proof
on the Commission. The difficulty of proving potential anti-
competitive effects has been emphasized by recent Supreme Court
decisions."' However, Congress created the Federal Trade Com-
mission precisely for this sort of practical factual determination.
VII. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE THEORY
A. "Unjustifiably" Low, Non-discriminatory Pricing
by a Multiproduct Firm
In Quaker Oats, the Commission indicated that it viewed the
charging of unjustifiably low, albeit uniform, prices by a large,
multiproduct firm to be a "potent weapon of predatory and destruc-
tive economic warfare, and hence unfair . . ." 182 This statement
recognizes the,practice of multiproduct firms of financing expansion
in one sector by profits earned in a more profitable sector, which
enables the firm to charge lower prices than it would absent the
"subsidization" available in the first sector. Where the differently
priced goods satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the
Robinson-Patman Act, this is often the scenario which precipitates a
Robinson-Patman Act case brought by a local firm against a
nationwide firm.
A seller who keeps his price very low or barely remunerative,
i.e., above marginal cost, on products facing competition, while at
the same time maintaining higher prices and profits margins on
11 ' See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974);
United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 94 S. CL 2788 (1974); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
' 12 Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131, 1193-94 (1964).
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different products is simply making an investment decision, The
ability of a multiproduct or multimarket firm to "underwrite" its
sales in certain areas from the profits in other markets may be
viewed as "unfair" by less diversified merchants. While such price
discrimination may evidence monopoly power," 3 it may also be
evidence of competitive conduct such as price cutting designed to
assist entry into a market surrounded by high barriers. Such mar-
kets are likely to net low profits initially for a new entrant. Obstruct-
ing entrance into such a "locked up" market by forbidding price
cutting discourages competition and is inconsistent with the general
pattern of the antitrust laws. 1 " Decisions about what profit margin
to accept are competitive investment decisions. The decision to
finance price cuts in another market is merely a choice of investment
policy. Financing one product by profits from another product or
market represents other investment opportunities foregone. The fact
that a firm could borrow money and, de facto, be in the same
position implies that opportunity costs and interest rates should be
computed as part of the cost of the low-priced product, thus com-
pounding the difficulty of computing the price cutter's costs. The
factor of complementary product lines also produces difficulty in
distinguishing between profitable and unprofitable lines. Unless the
price cutter is so powerful that it can afford to sell below marginal
cost long enough to drive out its competitors, the resulting primary
line injury will not likely be anti-competitive, and hence should not
be attacked under section 5 of the FTCA.
B. Non-Commodity, Non-Sale Transactionsm
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibited discriminatory
transactions must involve sales of commodities. The making of
loans, a sale of services, or a sale of real estate are examples of
common non-sale transactions in which price discrimination might
I" See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 34.5 (D. Mass.
1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954):
'" Compare this with the policy in other areas of antitrust of greater receptivity to
justifications and greater willingness to sanction restraints where the restraints are essential to
the continuation of the firm (usually a small firm or a new entrant) as a significant competitive
force in a market dominated by a few larger firms. Cf. Sandura Co, v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847
(6th Cir. 1964).
The same analysis could be applied to price cutting practiced by an oligopolist. Because
an oligopolist knows that an across the board price reduction on his part will be met by his
competitors, he may be unwilling to institute such cuts, yet he may nonetheless be willing to
test the water by a discriminatory price cut to one customer. Such price shading may
eventually be matched by his competitors, leading to a gradual disintegration of the pre-
existing oligopolistic price structure. Applying the Robinson-Patman Act to such a situation
discourages price movements and reinforces the rigidities of oligopolistic pricing.
185 A detailed study of the present state of the law in this area is found in ABA, Report
On Price Discrimination In Non-Sale And Non-Commodity Transactions (1973).
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arise, yet which are outside the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Likewise, the long-term lease of a machine, the licensing of patents,
the consignment of goods and other non-sale transactions are not
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act.' 86 The legislative history of
the Robinson-Patman Act indicates that the coverage of the law was
limited to conventional sales of tangible articles and products.'"
This probably reflects the types of business transactions most com-
mon at that time, and those foremost in the minds of the legislators.
If a price difference is cost-justified, it generally will not result
in an unreasonably anti-competitive effect. The theory of competi-
tive pricing is based on costs. A sale of a commodity is typically a
transaction which can be quantified by the accountant. The further
the transaction moves from this benchmark, the more difficult it
becomes to assign meaningful costs or values to the object of the
transaction. Long term leases of commodities, especially those in
which the allocation of risks resembles that accompanying a sale,
are am nable to the pricing practices applied to sales, and are thus
more susceptible to proof of anti-competitive effects. However,
though competition, for example, in the television market, may well
appear to be suffering as the result of discriminatory advertising
rates, proof could require determining the cost and value of a
minute of time on such widely diverse programs as a morning talk
show, the evening network news and a seasonal special. Given the
near impossibility of proving cost and establishing a causal relation-
ship with the alleged anti-competitive effects, most likely it would be
an unwise allocation of resources for the FTC to file complaints
against such service transactions under section 5, and non-sale
transactions should be attacked only where their elements closely
resemble those of a sale.
C. Long-term Procurement Arrangements
The Robinson-Patman Act requires that the discriminatory
transactions must be substantially or reasonably contempo-
raneous.' 88 Those differences in prices between two non-
1E16 E.g., Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969) (sale
of mutual fund shares); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Intl, Inc., 369 F.2d 268
(5th Cir. 1966) (contract with a news information service); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962)
(contractual right to advertising time during a television broadcast); General Shale Prod.
Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943)
(construction contract requiring contractor to furnish bricks at a stated price); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Co., 264 F. 138 (E.D. Mo. 1920), affd on other grounds, 258 U.S. 451
(1922) (lease of patents).
167 The use of such words as "manufacture, sale or delivery," "goods, wares or merchan-
dise," and "perishable goods" in § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), further supports a traditional
reading of the word "commodities."
I IS See Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Or. 1958).
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contemporaneous transactions which result from diverse market
conditions rather than from intent to discriminate have been held
sufficient to make the transactions not contemporaneous) 89 There
appear to be two reasons for the contemporaneous sales require-
ment: (1) to insure that the commodities sold are in fact relevant to
the current competitive situation between buyers or sellers; and (2)
to insure that the relevant market conditions are the same for each
sale.
Long-term procurement arrangements generally exist in two
settings. On the one hand, the market for the commodity involved
may be such that most competing purchasers enter into long-term
procurement arrangements, although they may have different com-
mencement dates and duration. On the other hand, it may also be
the case that only one firm in a market utilizes long-term procure-
ment arrangements, while the majority of the purchasers buy at
frequent intervals. In either case, the first reason for supporting the
contemporaneous sales requirement is not present since by their
nature, long-term procurement arrangements involve commodities
that would be purchased at frequent intervals except for the specific
arrangement. Primary line competition is thus affected by the grant-
ing of non-cost-justified favorable prices in connection with long-
term procurement arrangements. Assuming that buyers purchasing
under long-term procurement arrangements are in competition with
buyers who purchase at regular intervals for the market on their
level, the first justification also is unrelated to secondary line injury.
The second justification affects the use of section 5 and raises
the same problems of proof of anti-competitive harm raised by the
non-sale, non-commodity transactions. However, these problems
should not prevent the use of section 5 in such situations, but rather
they should serve to emphasize the need for careful analysis of
market conditions and cost-justification defenses.
Thus it can be concluded that the policies of the Robinson-
Patman Act which support the contemporaneous sale requirement
do not, per se, reflect a judgment to permit long-term procurement
arrangements to oust the statute. In addition, the anti-competitive
effects on the primary and secondary lines are the same whether one
or more of the sales involved in the discriminatory transactions was
a non-contemporaneous sale by virtue of being a long-term pro-
curement arrangement. 190 Accordingly, if proper consideration is
1" Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F1d 193 (9th Cir. 1969),
190 See, e.g., Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp. & American Distilling
Co., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding non-contemporaneous purchases within the scope
of § 2(a), in a case involving stock on hand, pUrchased at a previous date in large quantities,
being sold in competition with items more recently purchased by a competitor from the same
seller at a different price).
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given to changed market conditions, long-term procurement ar-
rangements should be subject to section 5 proceedings.
D. Economic Discrimination Resulting from Equal -Price Sales
Economic price discrimination is present not only where the
same goods with the same costs are sold at different prices, but also
where goods of like grade and quality but with different costs are
sold at the same price. However, the Robinson-Patman Act does not
cover the latter situation. 191
Two examples illustrate the types of situation in which equal-
pricing generates economic discrimination. The first situation in-
volves a Borden-typem manufacturer who sells both branded and
unbranded items which are commodities within the Robinson-
Patman "like grade and quality" phrase. Assume that the manufac-
turer sells his branded item to a favored customer while offering
competing customers only the unbranded item (at the same price as
the branded item), and also assume that it can be shown that the
cost of the branded item is greater than the cost of the unbranded
item (due perhaps to advertising, more elaborate containers, etc.). If
it is also true that (1) the price of the unbranded item is set to match
the price which provides a sufficient return on the unbranded item,
and (2) consumers will pay more for the branded than the un-
branded item, then retail-purchasers of the unbranded item will
either be forced to take a low return on that item in order to keep
the price to the consumer below the price of the branded item, or
they will lose customers to their competitor selling the branded item.
Although not covered by the Robinson-Patman Act, this is clearly a
case of secondary line injury. However, if indeed the unbranded
item can be manufactured and sold at a lower price, in a competi-
19 ' Although "like grade and quality" may appear to be an arbitrary distinction, it is a
necessary one in order to stop short of using § 5 to monitor a completely regulated economy.
For example, a situation, involving similar products, in which economic price discrimination
would have serious secondary line effects is illustrated by considering sales, by a manufacturer
to a favored retailer, of a deluxe model item at the same price as sales of the standard model
to competing, unfavored retailers. However, the difficulties of enforcing a prohibition against
economic price discrimination across the entire economy are staggering. To be sure, such
economic discrimination is subject to regulation in certain transportation fields (consider, for
example, the role of the ICC) but there is a quantum difference between regulating one sector
of the economy and the regulation that a theory of economic discrimination would allocate to
§ 5 of the FTCA. For if economic discrimination, rather than current Robinson-Patman Act
violations, is taken as the starting point, there is no reason to limit the prohibition to charging
the same price for different cost commodities. Any sale of commodities which resulted in a
seller receiving a different profit margin than he received on other sales to competing
purchasers, would fall within this expanded concept of price discrimination. Even if such a
regulatory system were feasibly enforceable, the decision to so drastically depart from the
limited thrust of the Robinson-Patman Act should come from the legislature, not from the
Commission.
192 United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
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tive market with low barriers to entry, either another manufacturer
would enter the field and manufacture the unbranded item at a
lower price, or the unfavored retailers themselves would arrange for
the unbranded item to be manufactured at a lower price. Unless the
seller has a natural monopoly, his decision not to sell the branded,
premium product simply opens up the market demand for another
seller to fill. Furthermore, those factors which would prompt a
manufacturer to limit the outlets for his premiuM product (e.g.,
limiting distribution to "exclusive" or high quality outlets) could well
indicate the lack of competition, on their level, between the favored
and the disfavored buyer. These considerations make it unlikely
that such pricing practices would substantially restrain competition.
A second situation in which equal-pricing economic discrimina-
tion may arise is where a manufacturer distributes through a dual
distribution system. Under the Robinson-Patman Act, a distributor
can sell to purchasers at different distribution levels at the same
price. The problem arises where some firms along the chain of
distribution integrate and produce an entity which buys at one
"level" of distribution but resells at a different "level." If the man-
ufacturer sells to an integrated firm at the same price as it sells to all
firms buying at that level, the non-integrated firms competing at its
selling level are injured.' 93 On the other hand, if the integrated firm
is required to pay the same price as its competitors at the selling
level, the integrated firm is denied the economics of its integration.
While it has been urged that the Commission should not use the
Robinson-Patman Act to require uniformity of prices when selling to
integrated and non-integrated firms,'" if the manufacturer himself
; 93
 For example, if Seller (S) sells directly to Wholesaler (W) and Independent Retailer
(IR) at a price of 90, there is no price discrimination unless Retailer (R) who buys from W, is
also considered a purchaser from S. If, under § 5, this price structure is held to be a violation,
S will, if 90 was indeed cost-justified, simply say that he will only sell direct, in large lots, to
purchasers who will pick up at the plant, etc. This latter result cannot be attacked because it
is not within the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act to regulate manufacturers' decisions
concerning how much marketing they wish to undertake. Assuming that only W and IR will
purchase under the set terms, it can be seen that IR should really also be viewed as a
vertically integrated wholesaler.
On the other hand, under a different dual distribution scheme, consider if Seller (52) sells
to Warehouse Distributor (WD); and WD in turn sells directly to Independent Jobber {IJ); and
both WD and IJ sell to Dealers. Assuming that (52) has control over prices and terms of sale
along the distribution chain, requiring that the price from S2 to WD equal the price from WD
to IJ (on the theory that IJ is an indirect customer of S2), and if both Ij and WD sell to
Dealers, results in injury to the integrated WD who also performs jobber functions.
These examples illustrate the dangers in comparing prices paid by purchasers who buy or
sell at the same level but who perform different distribution functions, usually by virtue of
operating on another level as well. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petition for Certiorari 16-24, Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F,2d 874
(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S, 1045 (1968).
l" See, e.g., Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
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prices in that way, the Robinson-Patman Act cannot always reach
him. Where the manufacturer charges an integrated wholesaler-
retailer or cooperative the same price charged to competing retailers,
directly or indirectly, the integrated firm is being denied any benefits
of its possibly more efficient distribution system. Uniform pricing,
unless justified by uniform manufacturer's costs, unreasonably im-
pedes the development of efficiently integrated firms, and therefore
is likely to be anti-competitive. Such functional pricing by the
manufacturer may stimulate a trend toward vertical integration
between the wholesale and retail levels, but vertical integration,
absent pre-existing horizontal market power, does not increase con-
centration or restrain competition. To the extent that there are
economies to be gained by vertical integration, and to the extent
that "equal pricing" inhibits such integration, the practice should be
vulnerable under section 5.
E. Independent Brokers
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to pro-
hibit the use of phony brokerage or price concessions given indi-
rectly to favored large buyers and disguised as a brokerage paid to
"dummy" brokers within the buyer's control. The Commission re-
cently dismissed allegations that five food store chains and "ground"
and "field" brokers had received illegal brokerage in violation of
section 2(c). 195 The basis for the dismissal was the lack of evidence
that the broker was acting for or in behalf of the buyer or subject to
the buyer's direct or indirect control.
The brokers involved operate "on the ground" or in the grow-
ing areas and perform various buying and shipping services. They
act as middlemen between the growers and the grocery stores. The
FTC's section 2(c) complaint was based upon the argument that
where a buyer obtains greater benefit from the broker than the seller
does, the Robinson-Patman Act is violated unless the buyer pays the
brokerage fee. Applying the model suggested in this article, the
complaint should have failed even if it had been brought under
section 5.
There is no evidence that the practice of a seller paying an
Petition for Certiorari 16-24, Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965)
cert. denied 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
195
 Doc. Nos. 8786-8790 were dismissed on January 22, 1974. .3 Trade Reg. Rep.
20,519, at 20,453 (FTC 1974). The Commission's dismissal orders cite: (I) Food Fair Stores,
Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.; HaIlee-Boy Sales, Orlando Fla.; and John P. Storm, Salinas, Calif.
(D.8786); (2) H.C. Bohack, Co., Brooklyn, N.Y. and Henderson Distrib. Co., State Farmers
Market, Pahakee, Fla. (D. 8787); (3) Jewel Companies, Chicago, Ill.; and Jack Stires, Inc. El
Centro, Calif. (D. 8788); (4) Borman Food Stores, Inc., Detroit, Mich. (D. 8789) and (5) First
Nat'l Stores, Inc. Somerville, Mass. and Ruby Produce Co., Pedricktown, N.J., (D. 8790).
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independent broker is anti-competitive, or, if so, that having the
buyer pay the fees in that case would be less anti-competitive.
Presumably, in computing the selling price, the seller included the
payments made to brokers. There was no evidence that the broker-
age paid by the seller was discriminatory. Therefore, since the
buyer's costs reflect the brokerage fees no more or less where he pays
them as part of the seller's price than where he pays them directly to
the broker, it is difficult to see why brokerage payments by sellers
should be anti-competitive regardless of whether buyer or seller
benefits more from the services. Furthermore, section 2(c) was not
designed to regulate when and by whom independent brokers
should be paid. Therefore, regulation of such payments under sec-
tion 5 involves a substantial and unwarranted extension of the
antitrust laws.
Assuming that small buyers pay more, for example, per crate of
lettuce than do chain stores, and further assuming that price differ-
ence is wholly attributable to higher brokerage charges, a require-
ment that the buyer pay such charges would change nothing.' 96
Whether the differential is cost-justified or in response to large buyer
pressure, it is not likely to disappear merely because the buyer pays
the brokerage fee. The price to the consumer and the profit to the
food store presumably will remain unchanged. Price differentials
charged by independent brokers are in fact differential brokerage
fees, not price discriminations masquerading as brokerage, and as
such represent discriminatory pricing in the sale of service. Assum-
ing that an independent broker provides different services for differ-
ent buyers and different sellers, proof that differential charges were
anti-competitive, were not attributable to costs, and were for the
purpose of favoring large buyers, will encounter the difficulties
discussed above.'"
F. The A & P Case
The FTC recently filed a complaint raising the issue of the
nature of the duty to investigate imposed on a buyer and a seller
where a seller offers a low bid to a buyer in order to meet lower bids
which the seller believes the buyer already has from competing
sellers. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 198 the FTC charged
A&P with a section 2(f) violation for knowingly inducing and receiv-
ing discriminatory prices for dairy products and a section 5 violation
' 95 See Borman Food Stores, Inc., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 11 18,707,
at 21,078 (Elman, Commissioner, dissenting).
' 97 See Part VI A, supra.
199 [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 11 19,639, at 21,685 and 11 19,826, at
21,838 (FTC 1972).
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for failure to provide its supplier, Borden, with material information
concerning competing bids. A&P and Borden were also charged with
membership in a combination illegal under section 5. 199 Borden had
given A&P a price quotation at which it would supply milk to A&P,
and informed A&P that the price was aimed at meeting the competi-
tive bids which A&P already possessed. A&P accepted the offer with
the knowledge that Borden had granted a substantially lower price
than the only other bidder, but failed to notify Borden of that fact.
Charging Borden and A&P under section 5 as members of an
illegal combination contravenes the model proposed in this article in
that the alleged violation falls within sections 2(a) or 2(f), unless it is
determined to be protected by_the "good faith meeting of competi-
tion" defense of section 2(b) (in the case of Borden) or the "un-
knowing" defense in A&P's case. Section •5 should not be used for
reaching instances of price discrimination which are covered (either
explicitly included or excluded) by the Robinson-Patman Act.
The validity of charging a purchaser under section 5 for failure
to notify a seller of the competing bids in the purchaser's possession,
where the seller has indicated that his bid is made in order to meet
competition, depends upon the competitive structure of the markets
in which the buyer and seller operate. Nondisclosure of the exact
level of competing bids is but one step in bargaining. In competitive
markets, competition is increased when buyers vigorously attempt
to bargain down sellers' prices. Likewise, a large buyer who pres-
sures an oligopolistic or monopolistic seller into lowering his price
may well initiate price cutting and lead to more competitive pricing
practices. On the other hand, pressure by a large buyer upon a
competitive seller is more likely to lead to some of the anti-
competitive results, sought to be prohibited by the Robinson-
Patman Act. By definition, a competitive seller is already selling at
or near a competitive price. A buyer who succeeds in inducing a
lower price further increases the large buyer's economic advantage
over his competitors. If the buyer chooses not to pass the savings on
to his customers, the anti-competitive implications are clear. How-
ever, if the buyer does pass the savings on in the form of lower
prices, factors, such as how large a share of the market the buyer
has and how close to marginal cost the seller's prices were, must be
examined in order to determine whether the buyer was merely
squeezing excess profits from his seller or whether he was in fact
using his market power as leverage to capture a larger share of his
market. Basically, the conclusion is that section 5 will not permit
large buyers to bargain as vigorously as small buyers. unless they are
199
 Id. 11 19,639 at 21,685.
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bargaining against large sellers. Where the fight is between two
heavyweights, a more competitive situation may result if they are
allowed to fight unhindered thari if section 5 is used to stabilize
prices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to formulate a working model for the
use of section 5 as an antitrust tool, especially in the area of price
discrimination law. The shortcomings of this endeavor, however,
must be recognized. There are obviously elements and considera-
tions important to antitrust law which have not been included in the
model. .Furthermore, situations may well arise which are not ade-
quately handled by the model. However, models do have advan-
tages which justify the effort necessary to develop them. The model-
ing technique provides an approach to problem solving different
than the frequently used ad hoc technique of legal adjudication.
Thus, it may produce different insights into the problem. Experi-
ence may expose flaws in the model which may require that it be
abandoned and that new analysis be undertaken. If the flaw-finding
and reanalysis lead to a more enlightened view of the problem,
than the initial model was itself useful. For these reasons, the
model's development and application should facilitate the task of
understanding and harmonizing the antitrust laws.
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